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This paper investigates an empirical puzzle in technology adoption for developing countries: the low
adoption rates of technologies like hybrid maize that increase average farm profits dramatically. I offer
a simple explanation for this: benefits and costs of technologies are heterogeneous, so that farmers
with low net returns do not adopt the technology. I examine this hypothesis by estimating a correlated
random coefficient model of yields and the corresponding distribution of returns to hybrid maize. This
distribution indicates that the group of farmers with the highest estimated gross returns does not use
hybrid, but their returns are correlated with high costs of acquiring the technology (due to poor infrastructure).
Another group of farmers has lower returns and adopts, while the marginal farmers have zero returns
and switch in and out of use over the sample period. Overall, adoption decisions appear to be rational
and well explained by (observed and unobserved) variation in heterogeneous net benefits to the technology.
Tavneet Suri






Food security is a major social and economic issue across many Sub-Saharan African economies.
Agricultural yields (output per acre) have fallen in the last decade across many of these
economies, despite the widespread availability of technologies that increase yields. For in-
stance, Table 1 shows the falling yields of staple crops over the last decade in Kenya, compared
with increasing yields in India and Mexico. Kenya has clearly not been able to take the same
advantage of improvements in agricultural technologies as have India and Mexico during
their Green Revolutions. This is not an isolated example, and is very worrisome for economic
policies intended to enhance food production and agricultural incomes.
The leading edge of agricultural technology has improved over the past few decades. Field
trials at experiment stations across Kenya have shown that hybrid maize and fertilizers can
increase yields and pro￿ts of maize signi￿cantly, with increases ranging from 40% to 100%
(see Gerhart (1975), Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, KARI (1993), Karanja (1996)).2
Despite this, the aggregate adoption rates of hybrid maize and fertilizer remain far below
100%, with no sustained increases in adoption over the past decade. This contrasts with the
experience in more developed countries; for example, adoption rates of hybrid in the US are
close to 100% (Griliches (1980) and Dixon (1980)).
The fact that improved agricultural technologies are not universally adopted, and that
adoption rates have remained persistently low over a long period of time, is the empirical
puzzle that motivates this paper. I ￿nd that if farmer heterogeneity is properly taken into
account, there is no puzzle. The farmers with high net returns to the technology adopt
it, and the farmers with low returns do not. Persistent lack of adoption is a re￿ ection
of the distribution of (observable and unobservable) costs and bene￿ts of the technology.
The approach here models households￿adoption decisions in an environment with household
speci￿c heterogeneity in the costs and bene￿ts, and hence pro￿ts, to the technology. I estimate
how the returns to the technology vary across farmers and then compare these returns to the
adoption decisions of farmers. I ￿nd that farmers with low (or zero) returns to the technology
are precisely the farmers who do not adopt it.
More speci￿cally, I use a generalized Roy model along the lines of Heckman and Vytlacil
(1997) where expected pro￿ts from hybrid maize are heterogeneous and drive adoption de-
cisions. This theoretical model implies a yield function for maize with a correlated random
coe¢ cient structure, which is estimated using a generalization of Chamberlain￿ s (1982, 1984)
method for ￿xed e⁄ects models, applied here to a correlated random coe¢ cients model. The
estimation results imply a distribution of returns that can endogenously a⁄ect adoption de-
2The Fertilizer Use Recommendations Project (FURP) in Kenya also shows high returns to hybrid maize
and fertilizer (see Hassan et al (1998)). These results are con￿rmed for fertilizer in the small sample of Du￿ o,
Kremer and Robinson (2008a) for Western Kenya. In fact, Du￿ o, Kremer and Robinson (2008b) analyze the
rates of return to fertilizer and show high, but variable, returns to fertilizer.
1cisions. I therefore provide an empirical resolution of the puzzle that, despite high average
returns to hybrid use, the marginal returns are low, and, given the infrastructure constraints
faced by farmers, adoption decisions are on the whole rational.
The estimation strategy allows for two di⁄erent forms of household-speci￿c heterogeneity
in maize production: absolute advantage (independent of the technology used) and compar-
ative advantage, which measures the relative productivity of a farmer in hybrid over non-
hybrid. The novel econometric contribution of this paper is to analyze the role of comparative
advantage in adoption decisions, to empirically estimate its importance, and to estimate its
distribution. I also discuss why this approach is preferable in development settings to related
approaches used to study ￿rms in developed countries, where the evolution of ￿rm e¢ ciencies
is more likely to be important in consistently estimating output and investment equations.
I use an extensive panel dataset representative of maize-growing Kenya for the period
1996 to 2004. I ￿rst document the adoption patterns of households for both hybrid maize
and fertilizer. Aggregate adoption is stable over the period, but, surprisingly, at least 30% of
households switch into and out of hybrid use from period to period.3 The panel structure of
the data allows me to identify the distribution of returns to hybrid maize and to estimate the
correlated random coe¢ cient structure of the underlying yield functions. The panel aspect
also allows me to construct counterfactual distributions of returns for all the farmers in the
sample, including those who do not use hybrid. It is important for identi￿cation that some
farmers switch in and out of use of the technology, and also that there are farmers in the
sample who use hybrid maize in every period. I discuss how the identi￿cation assumptions
used are supported by the timing of maize production, other characteristics of the production
process and the fact that shocks to yields like rainfall are observed in the data.
I ￿nd strong evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to hybrid maize, especially in the
sample excluding the two districts (out of a total of twenty two) with high adult mortality. I
estimate the distribution of returns, and compare the mean of this distribution to estimates
from standard approaches that fail to take full account of farmer heterogeneity, such as OLS,
IV and ￿xed e⁄ects models.4 OLS estimates of the average return are in the range of 50-
100%, models with ￿xed e⁄ects suggest returns of close to 0% and IV estimates (using supply
constraints as instruments) are on the order of 150-200%. The estimated mean gross return
from my approach is 60%, but some farmers have returns as high as 150%, while there are
many who have returns either close to zero or (in some cases) negative.
The estimated returns control for input use, but do not account for other costs (such as
3This lack of a trend with underlying switching of use from period to period is seen in other parts of
Africa. Dercon and Christiaensen (2005) ￿nd identical patterns for fertilizer use in Ethiopia. Du￿ o, Kremer
and Robinson (2008b) also ￿nd a lot of switching behavior in fertilizer use in Western Kenya.
4When there is heterogeneity in returns, IV estimates a local average treatment e⁄ect, i.e. the returns
for only the sub-population that is a⁄ected by the instrument. This could explain why OLS and IV are so
di⁄erent here and why di⁄erent instruments may give di⁄erent estimates.
2the costs of accessing the technology) and are therefore gross, rather than fully net returns.
The joint distribution of estimated returns and adoption decisions displays some remarkable
features. There are three sub-groups of farmers in the sample. A small group of farmers
has extremely high counterfactual returns to hybrid (about 150%), yet they choose not to
adopt. This is rather striking and seems to deepen the initial puzzle, but is well explained by
supply/infrastructure constraints, such as long distances to seed and fertilizer distributors.
These farmers have higher costs to using hybrid as they have poor access to input suppliers.
Their overall net counterfactual returns are therefore rather low. A comparatively larger
group of farmers have lower, though still high, returns and they adopt hybrid in every period.
Finally, a third group of farmers has essentially zero net returns and they switch in and out
of use of hybrid from period to period. These are marginal farmers who switch easily when
subject to shocks to the cost of and access to hybrid seed and fertilizer.
The heterogeneity in returns to this technology has important implications for policy. For
one, encouraging complete adoption of a technology that has a large average return among
existing adopters may be very ine¢ cient due to the much lower returns for the non-adopters.
In addition, knowing the distribution of returns to a technology allows for focused policy
interventions that can be cost e⁄ective. For example, for farmers who would have high returns
but are constrained on the supply side, alleviating their constraints by targeted distribution
of inputs and infrastructure improvements could improve yields dramatically. Similarly, the
unconstrained farmers would bene￿t from the development of new hybrid strains. This
research also illustrates the importance of the distributional consequences of policy and sheds
light on the ￿ scaling up￿of policy (see Attanasio et al (2003)).5
The literature provides a number of explanations for low adoption, ranging from learn-
ing models (Foster and Rosenzweig (1995)), informational barriers, credit constraints, taste
preferences, di⁄erences in agroecological conditions and local costs and bene￿ts, to time in-
consistency and the lack of e⁄ective commitment devices (see Du￿ o, Kremer and Robinson
(2008a)). The dominant approach has been to frame adoption decisions in a learning envi-
ronment where bene￿ts and costs to the technologies are homogeneous but unknown, and are
learned over time. The approach in this paper is in contrast to much of the literature. Since
these technologies have been available for many years and are well known and understood6
(as in Du￿ o, Kremer and Robinson (2008a, 2008b)), the approach here assumes the bene￿ts
and costs are known ex ante, but are spatially heterogeneous across farmers.
5The questions posed here cannot be answered with an experimental which randomizes the technology
across farmers without speci￿c assumptions. By contrast, I am interested in how farmers choose what tech-
nologies to use. With experimental data, one can test for the presence of heterogeneous returns, but estimating
the distribution of returns requires assumptions about the underlying selection process, which is randomized
away in such an experiment (see Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997)).
6For example in my sample, about 90% of households have used hybrid maize at some point in the past.
The mean number of years since ￿rst use for hybrid maize is 19.4 years and for fertilizer 20.5 years.
3The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines some relevant empirical
literature. Section 3 describes the institutional context and the data. Section 4 discusses
a theoretical framework for adoption decisions, clarifying the role of comparative advantage
and the identi￿cation assumptions needed to estimate the yield function. It also describes the
empirical model and its estimation. Section 5 discusses some descriptive baseline regressions,
such as OLS, ￿xed e⁄ects, IV, various treatment e⁄ects and preliminary evidence that het-
erogeneity in returns is relevant. Section 6 presents the results from the correlated random
coe¢ cient model and the associated distribution of returns. Section 7 discusses implications
of the results and a host of alternative models. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This section brie￿ y summarizes some of the empirical literature on technology adoption,
focusing on a few studies in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Suri (2006) for a more detailed review).7 I
describe the literature that has looked at the roles of heterogeneity, credit constraints, learning
externalities and ￿nally the more recent experimental research on similar technologies in
Kenya. The seminal empirical paper on technology adoption is Griliches (1957) who looked
at heterogeneity across local conditions in the adoption speeds of hybrid corn in Midwestern
US and emphasized the role of expected pro￿ts and scale. He noted how the speed of adoption
across geographical space depended on the suppliers of the technology and when the seed was
adapted to local conditions. For Kenya, Gerhart (1975) tracked the adoption of hybrid maize
in Western Kenya in the early 1970￿ s. He highlighted the fast di⁄usion of hybrid and identi￿ed
risk, education, credit availability, extension services and use of fertilizer as constraints.
There is a vast literature that describes the observable heterogeneity that drives adoption
decisions. For example Schultz (1963) and Weir and Knight (2000) emphasized education.
Various CIMMYT (The International Wheat and Maize Improvement Center) studies8 across
Kenya highlighted the following: unavailability and untimely delivery of the technologies; la-
bor and input use; costs; and unfavorable climactic conditions.9 There are a number of
7The literature on technology adoption is too vast to review here, excellent reviews are Sunding and
Zilberman (2001), Sanders, Shapiro and Ramaswamy (1996), Rogers (1995), Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985),
David (2003) and Hall (2004). For the theoretical literature, see Besley and Case (1993), Banerjee (1992) and
Just and Zilberman (1983). For studies of land management practices, see Mugo et al (2000); for agricultural
extension, see Evenson and Mwabu (1998); for property rights, see Place and Swallow (2000).
8See Doss (2003) and De Groote et al (2002) for a review of all the CIMMYT micro surveys in Kenya.
9For example, Makokha et al (2001) looked at fertilizer and manure use in Kiambu district. The main
(self-reported) constraints to use were unavailability and untimely delivery, high labor costs and high prices
of inputs. Ouma et al (2002) found that, in Embu district, gender, agroclimatic zone, manure use, hiring
of labor and extension services were signi￿cant determinants of the adoption of improved seed and fertilizer.
Wekesa et al (2003) looked at the adoption of varuous hybrids and fertilizer in the Coastal Lowlands where the
non-availability and high cost of seed, unfavorable climatic conditions, perceptions of su¢ cient soil fertility,
and lack of money were reasons for low use.
4papers focusing on credit constraints, mostly using self-reports (see Croppenstedt, Demeke
and Meschi (2003) for Ethiopia, Salasya et al (1998) for Western Kenya). Dercon and Christi-
aensen (2005) showed that the possibility of a poor harvest (and hence very low consumption)
can account for the low use of fertilizer in Ethiopia. Their data showed similar adoption pat-
terns to Kenya, with a lot of switching of technology use from period to period.
Much of the academic literature has focused on the learning externality described by
Besley and Case (1993), which I ￿nd little evidence for. These papers mostly studied the
Green Revolution in India where the learning externality was certainly key in the rapid growth
of new hybrid varieties developed for India. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) considered the
adoption of high yielding varieties in India and found that farmers with more experienced
neighbors are more pro￿table than those without. Munshi (2003) found these impacts to
be heterogeneous across crops. Conley and Udry (2009) studied the adoption of fertilizer
in the small-scale pineapple industry in Ghana and found evidence of social learning within
information neighborhoods (de￿ned by farmers as the people they discuss farming with).10
More recently, there has been a growing experimental literature. A number of ￿eld trials at
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) experiment stations, showing large increases
in yields from hybrid seed and fertilizer. One of the early experimental studies was the
Fertilizer Use Recommendations Project (FURP) in the early 1990￿ s to understand optimal
rates of fertilizer use (see Corbett (1998)). FURP recorded yields about half of those found at
experiment stations (KARI (1993)). Hassan et al (1998) showed higher adoption and faster
di⁄usion of hybrid in high potential areas, blaming poor extension, infrastructure and seed
distribution in the marginal areas. Hassan, Murithi and Kamau (1998) found that farmers
apply less fertilizer than optimal, leading to an estimated 30% yield gap.
De Groote et al (2003) considered an ex-ante impact assessment of the Insect Resistant
Maize for Africa project that develops GM maize varieties that are more resistant to stem
borers. They experimentally estimated a 13.5% crop loss due to these insects, valued at
about $80 million.11 Du￿ o, Kremer and Robinson (2008a) ran experiments to understand
the returns to fertilizer and the low use of fertilizer in Western Kenya. They found that
the average rate of return for investing in top-dressing fertilizer is between 100% and 162%
and that learning e⁄ects were extremely small. Their most signi￿cant contribution was to
implement the Savings and Fertilizer Initiative (SAFI) as a commitment device for farmers.
They showed that o⁄ering SAFI at harvest time (vs. planting) increases adoption by 17%
and that this e⁄ect is about equivalent to a 50% subsidy to the fertilizer price. Du￿ o, Kremer
and Robinson (2008b) looked at the heterogeneity in the returns to fertilizer. They found an
10Other studies of learning in Sub-Saharan Africa include Bandiera and Rasul (2003) for sun￿ ower in
Mozambique and Moser and Barrett (2003) for a rice production method in Madagascar.
11See http://www.cimmyt.org/ABC/InvestIn-InsectResist/htm/InvestIn-InsectResist.htm and Smale and
De Groote (2003) for more information on the CIMMYT IRMA and GM projects in Kenya.
5average annual return of about 70%, but zero returns to a combination of fertilizer and hybrid,
and some evidence of heterogeneity, stating that ￿the returns to fertilizer are smaller when
the control plot does better￿ . All of the empirical ￿ndings of Du￿ o, Kremer and Robinson
(2008a, 2008b) are consistent with the evidence in this paper, though my explanation for the
lack of adoption is di⁄erent.
3 Institutional Context and Data
I now describe the relevant institutional detail and the data, which help motivate the model
and empirical approach used. Maize12 is the main staple in Kenya, with 90% of the population
depending on it for income (Nyameino, Kagira and Njukia (2003)). Hybrid maize increases
yields and can be more resistant to agricultural stress (Hassan et al (1998)). Both fertilizer
and hybrid have been available since the 1960￿ s with more than twenty modern varieties of
seed released since 1955, though later releases have not shown large yield improvements.13 In
the data, about 70% of plots are planted with a hybrid variety released in 1986. Government
recommendations for the types and quantities of hybrid seed and fertilizer vary across the
country14, and both must be purchased each season. Hybrid seed replanted from the previous
year￿ s harvest (i.e. recycled hybrid seed) has little yield advantage over non-hybrid. Most
farmers (about 80% in the sample) use either both hybrid and fertilizer or neither. All
inorganic fertilizer was imported and not locally produced over this period.
From 1965 to 1980, hybrid variety 611 di⁄used in Western Kenya ￿at rates as fast as or
faster than among farmers in the US corn belt during the 1930￿ s-1940￿ s￿(Gerhart (1975)),
but this changed in the 1990￿ s.15 The most important government policy for this sector has
been pan-territorial seed pricing. The hybrid seed was all produced by KARI on research
stations and then distributed by Kenya Seed Company. The price of seed was not driven
by market forces, shows little variance over time and was ￿xed across the country. In the
data, only 1% of seed purchases are not from Kenya Seed Company. This pan-territorial seed
12McCann (2005) describes the fascinating history of maize in Africa. Smale and Jayne (2003) provide an
excellent review of maize policy in Kenya.
13Karanja (1996) states ￿newly released varieties in 1989 had smaller yield advantages over their prede-
cessors than the previously released ones... research yields were exhibiting a ￿ plateau e⁄ect￿ ￿ . Examples he
gives are KSII, which was followed in time by H611 (with a 40% yield advantage), then H622 (16%) and then
H611C (12%). H626 which had a 1% yield advantage over H625 was released eight years later.
14See Ouma et al (2002), Hassan (1998), Salasya et al (1998), Wekesa et al (2003) and Karanja (1996).
15Reform of the cereal sector began in 1988, followed by some liberalization in 1994. Smale and Jayne
(2003) and Karanja (1996) attribute early successes to good germplasm, e⁄ective research, good distribution,
coordinated marketing of inputs and outputs. This changed in the 1990￿ s as earlier policies of large subsidies,
price supports, pan-territorial seed/output pricing, restrictions on cross district trade resulted in large ￿scal
de￿cits. The National Cereals and Produce Board accrued losses of 5% of GDP in the 1980￿ s. For more on
the reforms, see Jayne et al (2001), Karanja, Jayne and Strasberg (1998), Jayne, Myers and Nyoro (2005),
Nyoro, Kiiru and Jayne (1999) and Wanzala et al (2001).
6pricing created poor incentives for suppliers to locate in distant areas or far from markets.16
3.1 Data
The dataset comes from the Tegemeo Agricultural Monitoring and Policy Analysis Project
between Tegemeo Institute at Egerton University, Kenya and Michigan State University. It is
a household level panel survey of Kenya, representative of rural maize-growing areas. Figure
1 shows a map of the survey villages and the population density across the country (darker
shades represent greater density). Though data are available for the years 1997, 1998, 2000,
2002 and 2004, for most of the analysis in this paper, I use the 1997 and 2004 data. The 1997
and 2004 surveys collect detailed agricultural input and output data, consumption, income,
demographics, infrastructure, and credit information.17 The panel sample covers just over
1200 households.
Figures 2 and 3 show the heterogeneity in hybrid and fertilizer use across provinces and
over time. Figure 2 shows the stability in aggregate hybrid maize adoption over time and
the persistence of cross-sectional di⁄erences.18 In principle, hybrid use could be a continuous
variable as farmers plant quantities of hybrid, but only 2% farmers in the sample plant both
hybrid and non-hybrid in a given season. I therefore take hybrid use to be binary throughout.
Figure 3a shows the trends across provinces in the fraction of households that use inorganic
fertilizer on maize and Figure 3b shows the total value (in constant Kenyan shillings) of
inorganic fertilizer used, both showing similar persistent cross-sectional di⁄erences.19 Figures
4a and 4b show the distribution of yields for 1997 and 2004 by technology, illustrating that
mean yields are much higher and the variance of yields lower in the hybrid sector, though
both these summary measures could be artifacts of selection (as I discuss in Section 4).
Table 2a shows summary statistics for my sample of households for 1997 and 2004.
Of the 26 di⁄erent types of fertilizer used, Table 2a shows the three most popular (di-
ammonium phosphate (DAP), calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN), and mono-ammonium
phosphate (MAP)). Table 2b breaks out some of these variables by hybrid/non-hybrid use
for 1997 and 2004. Yields are signi￿cantly lower across the board in the non-hybrid sector.
Maize acreage and total seed planted are not di⁄erent across sectors in 1997 and only just in
2004. Fertilizer, land preparation costs and main season rainfall are di⁄erent across the two
sectors. Finally, hired labor is only barely di⁄erent in 2004, family labor only barely in 1997.
16The seed market was liberalized post 2004 and in late 2008, fertilizer was subsidized.
17The 2000 and 1998 surveys are similar, but data on family labor was not collected in 2000, and 1998
covers only a sub-sample of 612 households. The 2002 survey was a short proxy survey.
18The Coast province looks rather di⁄erent in 2004. All the results in the paper are similar if the households
in the Coast province are dropped from the sample (59 households). In addition, looking across wealth/asset
or acreage quintiles, the pattern is identical with no systematic temporal variation in average adoption.
19Aggregate yields are not stable over time. There is a sharp drop in yields around 1997/1998, the result of
El Nino. However, there are no dynamics in any of the main inputs. For example, the acreage farmers plant
to maize is constant over this period. For more on these trends, see Suri (2006).
7The land preparation costs and labor variables merit some discussion. The land prepa-
ration costs variable reported in the summary statistics covers costs that are incurred either
before or right at the time of the seed choice and that do not include labor costs. The survey
collects the labor data for each component of the production process, separately for hired and
family labor. On average, about 75% of the total labor used for maize by these households is
family labor, which is di¢ cult to value (it should be valued at the shadow wage, which is not
observable).20 The main production activities that use labor are land preparation (about 23%
of total labor), planting (10%), weeding (36%) and harvesting (30%). Harvesting includes
all the post-harvest activities (threshing, winnowing, bagging, storage), which put the maize
into a form ￿t for sale or consumption. The survey records the harvest of maize in bags, i.e.
after all post-harvest activities.
Table 2c summarizes the labor variables by sector. Planting labor tends to be signi￿cantly
di⁄erent across the sectors since it is positively correlated with fertilizer use. Harvest and
post-harvest labor are also higher in the hybrid sector, unsurprising as the yields of hybrid are
higher. In terms of weeding, hired labor is only di⁄erent across the two sectors in 2004, and
family weeding only in 1997. Total weeding labor is not di⁄erent across the sectors in either
year. If I value family labor at the district hired labor wage, the dominant cost di⁄erences
between hybrid and non-hybrid production come from seed and fertilizer costs, and not from
labor cost di⁄erences. Finally, Table 2d shows the transitions of hybrid use in the data, with
30% of households switching in and out of use over 1997, 2000 and 2004. Including 2002, this
fraction becomes 39%. In the raw data, households that always plant hybrid have the highest
average yields, followed by households that switch in and out of use. Those that never use
hybrid have the lowest average yields.
4 Theory and Empirical Framework
This section ￿rst describes the theoretical foundations underlying my empirical model and
then the empirical framework. I am interested in estimating a distribution of returns to the
hybrid technology to assess if the farmers that do not adopt hybrid are those that do not
bene￿t from it. I do this by estimating the yield (production) function underlying farmers￿
adoption decisions. The exact structure of the adoption decisions is never estimated, so the
adoption model below is for illustrative purposes. I base the model on a comparison of pro￿ts
under hybrid and non-hybrid and it clearly illustrates the role of the ￿xed costs of acquiring
hybrid seed and fertilizer in the adoption decision, which is important for identi￿cation. The
model shows how the unobserved heterogeneity in the yield function is a key determinant in
20When I impute the shadow wage for family labor as the district level hired labor wage, I ￿nd that about
half my sample has negative pro￿ts, implying this is not the correct shadow wage, and that these households
tend to undervalue family labor.
8the pro￿t comparison underlying the hybrid decision. The aim of this section is, therefore, to
derive the fundamental of the yield function that is of interest: the distribution of farmers￿
comparative advantage in the production of hybrid maize, which is the correlated random
coe¢ cient in the yield function. I then discuss the underlying identi￿cation assumptions,
their validity and the estimation of this yield function.21
4.1 Adoption Decisions Under Pro￿t Maximization
I start with a simpli￿ed technology choice model where the farmer decides between hybrid
and non-hybrid seed. In reality, the technology choice is a joint decision of using both
hybrid and fertilizer or neither, which I elaborate on later. For ease of exposition, I use the
hybrid/non-hybrid choice as a parsimonious representation of this joint choice.
The timing of the farmer￿ s decisions is as follows. Each year, the farmer decides on his seed
technology at the beginning of the growing season, just before the rains begin. The farmer
makes his decision based on all his current information, his forward looking expectations
as to the coming year￿ s growing conditions, and the relative costs and bene￿ts (di⁄ering
productivities) of the two types of seed, which are assumed to be known to him.
The farmer is assumed to be risk-neutral and chooses a seed type to maximize pro￿ts per
area of land. He compares ￿￿H
it (pit;ait;bit;wit) and ￿￿N
it (pit;cit;wit), the maximized pro￿t
functions under hybrid and non-hybrid, respectively, where pit is the expected output price
of maize for both hybrid and non-hybrid maize22, ait represents the (￿xed) cost of obtaining
hybrid seed (due to availability di⁄erences), bit is per-unit cost of hybrid seed, cit is the
(very low, if not zero) per unit costs of replanting non-hybrid seed from the previous year￿ s
harvest and wit ￿ (w1it;w2it;:::;wJit) represents the vector of input prices for the inputs Xk
jit,
j = 1;:::;J and k 2 H;N. The pro￿t functions are:
￿H
it = pitY H






it = pitY N






it and Y N
it are the yields of hybrid and non-hybrid maize respectively and sit is the
quantity of seed used. In addition, I have imposed the following restrictions based on the
21Note that pro￿t functions themselves are di¢ cult to estimate here due to the widespread use of family
labor, which is hard to value. Households do not value family labor in the same way as hired labor. Below, I
show that the yield function here is similar to a gross revenue function (as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)).
As a robustness check, I estimate a model using the value of yields and valuing all the inputs where possible
using their prices. The results are extremely similar. Finally, if I assume that family labor is valued at hired
labor wages, I can estimate pro￿t functions, which also show qualitatively similar results.
22There is no distinction in the output market between hybrid and non-hybrid maize.
9institutional context in Section 3. First, the quantity of seed used for a given area of land
is the same whether it is hybrid or non-hybrid seed.23 Second, since the seed price is ￿xed
across space, bt is indexed only by t and not i.
































I can rewrite the second term on the right-hand side of the inequality in (3) as the normalized
(by the price of maize) cost di⁄erence between hybrid and non-hybrid seed. In fact, it is the
case that s￿
it ￿ s￿, as evidenced in Tables 2a and 2b where both the quantity of seed used for a
given area of land and the land area planted to maize are similar over time. This comes from
standard seeding rates for maize and since land markets barely exist, there is little change in
land ownership and land cropped to maize over time (see Suri (2006)).24





























￿ Ait + ￿s
it (4)
where ￿s





pit. In reality, the value of cit, the cost of
non-hybrid, is close to zero (relative to the hybrid cost) and the output price pit does not
vary much across space (time by province dummies explain 60% of the variation in pit).
From the evidence on input use in Table 2b, the optimized quantities of inputs apart from
fertilizer tend to be about equal under hybrid and non-hybrid. If, in addition, I assume that
fertilizer is only used with hybrid (as in the data) and that a ￿xed amount is used per land
allocated to hybrid in each year, then fertilizer costs are subsumed in bt in equation (3) and
hence in ￿s
it.25 If this is the case, then the farmer chooses hybrid if
￿
Y ￿H
it ￿ Y ￿N
it
￿
> Ait + ￿s
it (5)
23There are standard seeding rates for maize that do not vary by seed type. This is borne out by the
empirical seeding rates not varying much over time and not varying across hybrid and non-hybrid sectors.
24Note that the second term on the RHS of equation (3) can be ignored if the cost of obtaining hybrid
seed, ait, is much greater than the straight cost di⁄erence between hybrid and non-hybrid seed, which seems
to be borne out in reality.
25This is purely for expositional purposes, since the decision rule it leads to in equation (25) can be amended
to include other input costs. Even if I allow the optimized inputs to di⁄er by hybrid and non-hybrid for a
given farmer (such as for harvest labor), this will create no bias in the empirical work since the estimated
yield function does not depend on the counterfactual input use and conditions on inputs for the observed
hybrid/non-hybrid choice. The other reason for taking the approach in the text is that for all inputs other
than harvest/post-harvest labor, the assumptions are empirically true, and valuing labor is problematic in
this context. Therefore, departures from the strict assumptions in the text should be thought of as captured
in the error term #it in the decision rule in equation (25).
10It is clear that adoption decisions based on pro￿ts depend fundamentally on yield compar-
isons. The above assumptions simply isolate the components of the adoption decision that
are important to the identi￿cation and estimation of the yield function, which I now describe.
4.2 The Underlying Yield Functions





























These production functions for hybrid and non-hybrid maize have di⁄erent parameters on the
inputs, ￿H and ￿N, to allow for di⁄erential complementarity between the seed variety and
the inputs (though the same set of potential inputs are used). uH
it and uN
it are sector-speci￿c
errors that may be the composite of time-invariant farm characteristics and time-varying













I now place additional structure on the unobserved productivities and impose the following









Farmers are assumed to know ￿H
i and ￿N
i , but not ￿H
it and ￿N
it, when making their seed choice.
The transitory errors, ￿H
it and ￿N
it, are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other and with
the Xit￿ s, and do not a⁄ect the hybrid decision (as per Heckman and Honore (1990)). It is




i ) plays a role in the hybrid choice. I
discuss this further in Section 4.4.
Following Lemieux (1998), since the relative magnitudes of the unobserved ￿H
i and ￿N
i
are not identi￿ed, I de￿ne the relative productivity of a farmer in hybrid over non-hybrid as
11(￿H
i ￿ ￿N










i ) + ￿i (13)
where the projection coe¢ cients are bH = (￿2
H ￿ ￿HN)=(￿2
H + ￿2




N ￿ 2￿HN) and ￿HN ￿ cov(￿H
i ;￿N
i ), ￿2
H ￿ V ar(￿H
i ), and ￿2
N ￿ V ar(￿N
i ):26
The ￿i is farmer i￿ s absolute advantage: its e⁄ect on yields does not vary by technology,
and it is (by construction of the linear projection) orthogonal to (￿H
i ￿ ￿N
i ). The gain,
(￿H
i ￿ ￿N




De￿ning ￿ ￿ bH
bN ￿ 1, equations (12) and (13) become
￿H
i = (￿ + 1)￿i + ￿i (15)
￿N
i = ￿i + ￿i (16)
I am interested in the structural parameter ￿ and the distribution of ￿i, fundamentals of the
production function. The ￿i￿ s are the key unobservables that determine selection into hybrid.
Using this decomposition of uH
it and uN
it, I can rewrite equations (8) and (9) as27
yH
it = ￿H




t + ￿i + ￿i + Xit￿N + ￿N
it (18)
I use a generalized yield equation of the form,
yit = hityH
it + (1 ￿ hit)yN
it (19)
and substituting in equations (17) and (18), I get
yit = ￿N
t + ￿i + (￿H
t ￿ ￿N
t )hit + X0
it￿N + ￿￿ihit + X0
it(￿H ￿ ￿N)hit + ￿i + "it (20)
Equation (20) is my basic empirical speci￿cation - Section 4.5 describes the estimation in









i ). For the ￿i￿ s to be equal across sectors, bH ￿ bN must be equal to











it implies a more complex Cobb-Douglas production function



















it , and similarly for non-hybrid maize.
12detail. Since, the coe¢ cient on hit, ￿￿i (the ￿fth term in the equation), depends on the
unobserved ￿i, this is a correlated random coe¢ cient (CRC) model where the ￿i￿ s are corre-
lated with the adoption decision.28 I estimate two components of this model: the coe¢ cient
￿ that describes how important di⁄erences in comparative advantage are and, second, the
distribution of ￿i and hence the corresponding heterogeneous returns to hybrid.
Intuitively, in a speci￿cation like equation (20), ￿i measures farmer i￿ s relative produc-
tivity in hybrid over non-hybrid, i.e. his comparative advantage in hybrid. The ￿i￿ s are a
fundamental of the production function, but also play a role in the adoption decision. If the
farmers with high ￿i￿ s have lower gains to switching to hybrid from non-hybrid, then ￿ < 0.
In that case, relative to the mean ￿i in the population, a farmer would need a small ￿i in order
to meet the adoption criterion. This is the notion of selection on the basis of comparative
advantage, in that those with lower baseline productivities have larger gains to switching
to the new technology. The coe¢ cient ￿ therefore describes the sorting in the economy. If
￿ < 0, there is less inequality in yields in this economy as compared to an economy where
individuals are randomly allocated to a technology. On the other hand, if ￿ > 0, then the
self-selection process leads to greater inequality in yields. To see this, from equation (20), if
we let ￿i = ￿i + ￿i, then ￿i is a household speci￿c intercept (average yield) and ￿￿i is the
household speci￿c return to hybrid. Since ￿i and ￿i are uncorrelated by construction, the
covariance between ￿i and ￿￿i is ￿￿2
￿. The sign of ￿ is therefore the sign of the covariance
between a household￿ s overall average yield and its return to hybrid. A negative ￿ implies
that farmers that do better on average do worse at hybrid and vice versa for a positive ￿.
4.3 The Role of Fixed Costs in the Adoption Decision
In this section, I discuss the implications of pro￿t maximization to illustrate how changes in
infrastructure and access to seed and fertilizer distributors a⁄ect adoption decisions. This
pro￿t maximization approach is a generalization of the strict Roy model where adoption de-
cisions are based purely on the outcome (yields). I combine the yield function decomposition
of Section 4.2 with the pro￿t maximization problem of 4.1 to discuss how the farm speci￿c
comparative advantage parameters combine with the costs of acquiring seed and fertilizer to
determine the hybrid adoption decision.
Rewriting (4) in log-output and using (8) and (9), a farmer chooses hybrid if
E(uH
it ￿ uN














In the data, the revenue in hybrid is about double that in non-hybrid. 30% of this is due
28Also note that equation (20) is a generalization of the household ￿xed e⁄ects model (see Suri (2006)).
13to di⁄erential seed and fertilizer costs, 4% is land preparation cost di⁄erences, 7% is hired
labor cost di⁄erences, family labor goes the other way and the rest is pro￿t di⁄erences and
costs of acquiring seed over and above the seed price. Apart from fertilizer, the optimized
inputs x￿H
jit and x￿N
jit are not substantially di⁄erent, so if ￿H
j ’ ￿N
j for all inputs j, then the
last term in this expression is zero for all inputs except fertilizer.29 If for fertilizer, I assume
as above that fertilizer is used only with hybrid and in ￿xed proportions per area of land,
then fertilizer is subsumed in the ￿s
it. In this case, the adoption rule reduces to:
E(uH
it ￿ uN




Substituting in equations (10) and (11), and using equations (15) and (16),
(￿H
i ￿ ￿N








Equation (24) implies that the technology choice will depend on (i) unobserved, farmer-
speci￿c, time-invariant comparative advantage ￿i that comes from the underlying production
function, (ii) pure macroeconomic factors a⁄ecting the di⁄erential productivity of hybrid and
non-hybrid seed (￿H
t ￿￿N
t ), (iii) potentially time varying costs of obtaining hybrid, Ait, and
(iv) the real relative purchase costs of hybrid seed, ￿s
it. The key aspect of the Ait costs is
that they a⁄ect the demand for hybrid seed, but not production and yields directly.30
This framework illustrates how to empirically relate my comparative advantage estimates
to observables. Let ￿i ￿ Et [Ait] be the population time mean of the real ￿xed costs of
acquiring hybrid seed for each farmer, and let #it ￿ Ait ￿ ￿i. Re-writing equation (24),
￿￿i ￿ ￿i > ￿s
it ￿ (￿N
t ￿ ￿H
t ) + #it (25)
where ￿i is the permanent component of the ￿xed costs (i.e. the average real ￿xed costs for
a farmer over time) and #it the period to period ￿ uctuations in these costs.
Clearly, ￿￿i cannot be separately distinguished from the permanent component of ￿xed
costs, ￿i. In the empirics, I relate the estimated comparative advantage to permanent aspects
of infrastructure, since both act in an equivalent way to drive adoption decisions across
farmers. By contrast, the changes in the ￿xed costs, #it, drive adoption decisions for a given
29It is important to emphasize again that the assumption that the term involving the optimized inputs is
zero is purely for expositional convenience, in addition to it being roughly true in the data. The estimated
yield equation will condition on the observed input intensities. So, even without this simplifying assumption,
conditional on the observed input intensities, the counterfactual input intensities do not a⁄ect the observed
outputs, so their role in the adoption decisions does not create bias in the empirical work.
30￿
s
it, the relative per unit costs of hybrid seed normalized by the output price also play a role, as equation
(24) makes clear. But, as this varies mostly across time and not by individual, it is absorbed by the time
dummies I include in the empirical speci￿cations.
14farmer over time. Section 4.4.3 discusses the empirical evidence on these costs.
4.4 Identi￿cation of The Generalized Yield Function
The basic equation I estimate is equation (20):
yit = ￿N
t + ￿i + (￿H
t ￿ ￿N
t )hit + X0
it￿N + ￿￿ihit + X0
it(￿H ￿ ￿N)hit + ￿i + "it
In this section, I discuss the identi￿cation assumptions needed to estimate this and the
justi￿cations for them. While the projections in equations (15) and (16) only impose uncor-
relatedness of the absolute advantage, ￿i, and the comparative advantage, ￿i, my empirical
work does not require this level of generality. So, as in Lemieux (1993), I use the stronger suf-
￿cient assumption of mean independence of the composite error (￿i+"it) and the comparative
advantage component (￿i) and the histories of the regressors, i.e. that
E(￿i + "itj￿i;hi1:::hiT;Xi1;:::XiT) = 0 (26)
With respect to the absolute advantage component, ￿i, the assumption in equation (26) is
not restrictive for two reasons. First, by de￿nition, ￿i does not a⁄ect the di⁄erential return
to growing hybrid (it is di⁄erenced out of ￿H
i ￿ ￿N
i as per equations (15) and (16) above).
Second, Heckman and Honore (1990) discuss the identi￿cation of the Roy model and show
that if the absolute advantage plays a role in adoption decisions, then the Roy model has
no empirical content. This assumption is therefore simple the standard strict exogeneity
requirement used in panel data models.31
The strict exogeneity assumption on the transitory part of the composite error, "it, is
more restrictive, though since the data includes measures of shocks to yields, this assumption
is more plausible than if I did not observe such shocks. In terms of the primitives of the
model,
"it ￿ hit￿H
it + (1 ￿ hit)￿N
it (27)
So, the mean independence assumption regarding "it implies that ￿H
it and ￿N
it from equations
(17) and (18) do not a⁄ect the farmer￿ s decision to use hybrid and, crucially, the farmer￿ s
switching behavior. I discuss the various types of possible shocks and how they relate to yields
and hybrid decisions in the following two subsections. Given the long lag between planting
31The assumption in equation (26) implies that E(￿ij￿i) = 0 by the Law of Iterated Expectations. As
shown in Section 4.5.1, ￿i can be written as the linear projection ￿i = ￿0 + ￿1hi1 + ￿2hi2 + ￿3hi1hi2 + vi.
Given the mean independence of ￿i from the adoption history discussed above, the additional assumption
that E(￿ij￿i) = 0 only implies E(￿ijvi) = 0. This last assumption is not actually needed for the empirical
work, as the relationship between these two error components is left unspeci￿ed - they can be correlated, for
example, and my empirical approach is still consistent. So, the mean independence assumption in (26) is ￿ overly
strong￿ , but is useful for expositional convenience concerning the adoption behavior and the assumptions on
the composite error term. I do make the strict exogeneity assumption regarding ￿i, as just described.
15and harvest (an average of four or more months), I consider two ￿ types￿of ￿
j
it (j 2 H;N)
transitory shocks to yields: those that occur after the seed choice has been made and those
that occur before. I discuss each separately below and then the implications for the switching
behavior.
4.4.1 Shocks Realized After the Technology Choice
Central to identi￿cation is the fact that the hybrid seed choice is made before the farmer
experiences most of the agricultural shocks to yields. However, the shocks post planting may
a⁄ect optimal input use di⁄erentially for hybrid and non-hybrid and hence pose a problem for
identi￿cation. So, it is key that the most important transitory shock post planting, rainfall,
is observable in the data and can be controlled for. There may be other unobservable shocks
to yields that are correlated with inputs, such as weeds, pests, disease, etc. Hassan, Onyango
and Rutto (1998) use survey data to rank farmers￿perceptions of the most important maize
production shocks and what options are available to farmers to deal with these shocks. They
￿nd that inadequate and/or erratic rainfall is one of the most widespread and one of the two
worst shocks to yields across all zones.32
In addition, given the timing of production, the inputs that could be adjusted after the
technology choice are only a sub-sample of the labor inputs since the empirical speci￿cation
will allow for the joint hybrid-fertilizer decision. The main labor activities are land prepara-
tion, planting, weeding, harvest and post harvest. Land preparation and planting are costs
incurred before the technology choice and harvest and post-harvest after all shocks are real-
ized. The only input that could therefore be an issue is weeding labor. Table 2c shows that
the use of weeding labor in the sample is not very di⁄erent across hybrid and non-hybrid
farmers. Du￿ o, Kremer and Robinson (2008b) compare plots that use hybrid and fertilizer,
those that use just fertilizer and those that use non-hybrid and no fertilizer. Other than the
cost of the seed and fertilizer, they state that farmers reported no di⁄erences in the time
spent weeding across these plots and their ￿eld o¢ cers observed no di⁄erences in weeding.
Overall, it seems that shocks realized after the hybrid choice are well captured by the
32I have also investigated other potential shocks. For example, Hassan, Onyango and Rutto (1998) also
identify Striga (a weed) as an important issue in three agro-ecological zones (pests and most diseases do not
rank high). Hassan and Ransom (1998) carefully analyze Striga and state there is ￿no conclusive evidence that
local vs. improved maize, time of planting, and cropping pattern either encourage or discourage Striga￿ . The
occurrence of Striga therefore seems to be uncorrelated with the hybrid decision and should not pose a problem
for identi￿cation. As a robustness check, where I can match my households to these three zones, I drop these
households and the results are extremely similar. Another example is temperature - maize grows best in a
temperature range of 24-30 degrees C and has trouble germinating at temperatures above 38 (see Pingali and
Pandey (1999) and McCann (2005)). All the maize areas in Kenya ￿t within this range of temperatures.
Looking at data on monthly temperatures for 1956 to 2006 by latitude and longitude, the maximum observed
temperature is 23 degrees. The warmest part of the country in my sample is probably the Coast Province. As
a robustness check, I drop the households in the Coast Province from the analysis and it does not qualitatively
change the results.
16variables in my data since rainfall is observed and post planting input use is unlikely to be
di⁄erential across technologies.
4.4.2 Shocks Realized Before the Technology Choice
Even though the identi￿cation assumptions seem robust to shocks realized after the tech-
nology choice, there could be an issue with shocks that happen between 1997 and 2004 and
a⁄ect the use of hybrid as well as yields. An example may be changes in household structure,
for example the death of adults in the household due to HIV, that a⁄ect the quality of labor
as well as the decision to use hybrid. In all the empirical results reported, I control directly
for household structure (excluding these controls does not a⁄ect the results, see Suri (2006)).
In addition, all the results in the paper are reported for the full sample as well as for the
sample that excludes two districts where much of the adult mortality was concentrated over
this period and where HIV is prevalent. The results are stronger and more consistent in the
latter case, implying that my description of adoption decisions is most relevant for the sample
that excludes the two high mortality districts, what I refer to as the non-HIV sample.33
4.4.3 The Switching Behavior in Practice
The identi￿cation assumptions just described translate directly into assumptions on what
drives the hybrid switching behavior in the data. Essentially, the unobserved time-varying
variables that drive the switching should not be correlated with yields. I argue that the
switching behavior is driven by exogenous changes in the availability of seed and fertilizer.
If hybrid seed and/or fertilizer are not easily available at the time of planting, this would
manifest itself in a supply constraint or a higher cost of using hybrid, and the farmer would
switch to non-hybrid.34
There is a lot of qualitative evidence that this happens often. Farmers get their seed
and fertilizer from very small local distributors, who get their supplies from slightly larger
distributors, etc. In the survey, farmers who use non-hybrid were asked why they do not use
improved seed varieties and 14% blamed unavailability of seed as one of top two reasons for
this, 65% put high costs as one of the top two reasons. The 2000 survey (data not shown,
see Suri (2006)) showed that one of the common fertilizers (MAP) was not used at all in
the sample due to a macro level unavailability. Several of the CIMMYT and FURP studies
mentioned earlier cited unavailability of inputs, issues that were also at the forefront of The
33The survey does not necessarily identify the cause of death accurately so these are not necessarily all
HIV related deaths. However, these two districts are well known to be the areas with extremely high HIV
prevalence rates. So, it is likely that the high mortality rates in these two districts are a consequence.
34The framework in Dercon and Christiaensen (2005), for example, shows the switching to be related to
households￿ability to smooth downside consumption risks. This would be compatible with my framework.
17Africa Fertilizer Summit in 2006.35 In addition, there are certainly changes in the pricing
and availability of seed and fertilizer from period to period, especially since the Kenyan
government plays such an active role in these markets.36
Finally, Tables 2a and 2b show the changes in infrastructure between 1997 and 2004.
These have been due to private investment in fertilizer distribution networks, with now more
than 10 importers, 500 wholesalers and 7000 retailers in the country (see Ariga, Jayne and
Nyoro (2006)). For example, the distance to the closest fertilizer seller fell from 6.3 km in
1997 to 3.5 km in 2004 (a fall from 4.9 km to 2.4 km for hybrid farmers and from 9.3 km to
5.1 km for the non-hybrid).
4.5 Estimating a Model with Heterogeneous Returns
I now describe how to estimate the CRC model in equation (20).37 An alternative estimation
framework would be to use contemporary IO methods. However, in the face of the correlated
heterogeneity in equation (20), methods such as those of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003) that focus on unobserved time-varying productivity are inconsistent
since the returns to hybrid are heterogeneous and correlated with the decision to use hybrid.
Also, in the contexts those papers examined, productivity shifts for existing ￿rms and the
productivities for the ￿rms leaving and entering the industry, are of key importance in esti-
mating responses to regulatory or trade environments. In my scenario, given the static but
cross-sectionally heterogeneous nature of the returns to hybrid and the underlying produc-
tivities of Kenyan farmers, it is of less importance to deal with time-varying productivities,
since the approach controls for the dominant time varying shocks to output e⁄ectively.
4.5.1 Empirical Identi￿cation of the CRC Model
The estimation strategy I use is a generalization of the Chamberlain (1982, 1984) correlated
random e⁄ects approach. It parallels Chamberlain (1984) in how the model is identi￿ed and
how the parameters of the model are estimated, most importantly ￿. Later, I describe how
to use these estimates to derive a distribution of the predicted ￿i￿ s. For simplicity, I ￿rst
35For the Africa Fertilizer Summit 2006, see http://www.africafertilizersummit.org/.
36The price of fertilizer varies tremedously over time since its supply and availability vary. It is crucial
that the fertilizer be available right before planting. Since the early 2000￿ s, the National Cereals and Produce
Board (NCPB) has been importing fertilizer in bulk and sometimes selling it at lower prices to farmers. A
Lexis Nexis search covered only one newspaper and returned 55 articles between 1999 and 2004 documenting
the role of the government in fertilizer, seed and maize markets. The articles discuss changes in prices of the
inputs in di⁄erent parts of the country, often due to shortages (DAP in 1999 and 2004), delays in the imports
by the NCPB (2004), a stop to MAP fertilizer aid from Japan (late 1990￿ s on) and the dramatic changes in
the structure of the institutions that help farmers get access to inputs.
37This empirical model is similar to models of individual speci￿c heterogeneity in Heckman and Vytlacil
(1997), Card (2000, 1998), DeschŒnes (2001), Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2001), Carneiro and Heckman
(2002), and Wooldridge (1997). Lemieux (1998) uses the same model to look at whether the return to union
membership varies along observable and unobservable dimensions.
18describe how to estimate the model without covariates:
yit = ￿ + ￿hit + ￿i + ￿￿ihit + uit (28)
where uit ￿ ￿i + "it and assuming ￿H
t ￿ ￿N
t ￿ ￿ 8t. Relaxing this assumption empirically
does not change the results.
To estimate equation (28), I eliminate the dependence of the observed ￿i￿ s on the endoge-
nous input (hit), by following Chamberlain to exploit the linear projection of ￿i on the full
history of the inputs, though the projection I use is more general. The ￿i￿ s are projected
onto not just the history of the hybrid decisions, but also their interactions so that, in the
two period case, the projection error is orthogonal to hi1 and hi2 individually as well as to
their product, hi1hi2 by construction.38 The generalized linear projection used is:
￿i = ￿0 + ￿1hi1 + ￿2hi2 + ￿3hi1hi2 + vi (29)
In addition, the ￿i￿ s are normalized so that
P
￿i = 0.39 This normalization implies that ￿0
can be written as a function of ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3 from equation (29).
Here, the coe¢ cient ￿3 is of crucial importance to the empirical identi￿cation and esti-
mation of the model, and is where this is a generalization of Chamberlain￿ s approach. The
hi1hi2 interaction term is necessary in the projection to ensure that vi is orthogonal to every
possible history of hybrid use. Since all the hit variables describing the use of hybrid are
dummies, to estimate ￿3 it is necessary to have farmers in the sample that have planted hy-
brid in both periods. Also note that the projection does not have a behavioral interpretation,
but is used purely to purge ￿i of its dependence on the full histories of the inputs.
Substituting the projection into the yield equation for each of the two time periods gives:
yi1 = (￿+￿0)+[￿1(1+￿)+￿+￿￿0]hi1+￿2hi2+[￿3(1+￿)+￿￿2]hi1hi2+(vi+￿vihi1+ui1) (30)
yi2 = (￿+￿0)+￿1hi1+[￿2(1+￿)+￿+￿￿0]hi2+[￿3(1+￿)+￿￿1]hi1hi2+(vi+￿vihi2+ui2) (31)
The corresponding reduced forms are:
yi1 = ￿1 + ￿1hi1 + ￿2hi2 + ￿3hi1hi2 + &i1 (32)
38Chamberlain￿ s CRE model uses the projection ￿i = ￿1hi1 +￿2hi2 +vi, which, when substituted into the
yield function, gives yit = ￿0 + ￿1hi1 + ￿2hi2 + ￿hit + ￿￿0 + ￿￿1hi1hit + ￿￿2hi2hit + vi + ￿vihit + uit. Even
though vi is uncorrelated with hi1 and hi2 individually (by the nature of the projection), it could be correlated
with their product, hi1hi2, so that E [vihi1hi2] 6= 0. The CRC projection must therefore also include all the
interactions of the hybrid histories.
39This normalization is used so that ￿ in equation (28) corresponds to the average return to hybrid as in a
standard ￿xed e⁄ects model. This normalization ￿xes the average ￿i in the sample and does not change the
ordering of the ￿i￿ s across the hybrid histories of farmers.
19yi2 = ￿2 + ￿4hi1 + ￿5hi2 + ￿6hi1hi2 + &i2 (33)
Equations (32) and (33) give six reduced forms coe¢ cients (￿1;￿2;￿3;￿4;￿5;￿6), from which
the ￿ve structural parameters (￿1;￿2;￿3;￿;￿) can be estimated using minimum distance. The
structural parameters are therefore overidenti￿ed given these minimum distance restrictions:
￿1 = (1 + ￿)￿1 + ￿ + ￿￿0
￿2 = ￿2
￿3 = (1 + ￿)￿3 + ￿￿2
￿4 = ￿1
￿5 = (1 + ￿)￿2 + ￿ + ￿￿0
￿6 = (1 + ￿)￿3 + ￿￿1 (34)
There may seem to be six structural parameters, since ￿0 is in equations (29) and (34).
However, given the normalization
P
￿i = 0, then ￿0 = ￿￿1hi1 ￿ ￿2hi2 ￿ ￿3hi1hi2 where hi1
and hi2 are the averages of the adoption decisions in periods one and two, and hi1hi2 is the
average of their interaction.
From the restrictions above, for example, ￿ could be (ine¢ ciently) estimated as a combi-







that if ￿2 and ￿4 are equal, then ￿ is not identi￿ed. Requiring ￿2 and ￿4 to be di⁄erent means
that the reduced form e⁄ect of the hybrid decision in period two on yields in period one has
to be di⁄erent from the reduced form e⁄ect of the hybrid decision in period one on yields
in period two. Since these are reduced form coe¢ cients, this could structurally arise from a
number of mechanisms. One example directly from the theory above would be di⁄erential
shocks to the costs in each period, i.e. di⁄erent #it (see equation (25)) in each period. In
Table 7, the null that ￿2 = ￿4 can clearly be rejected. In addition, in the extension discussed
in Section 4.5.2 where the use of fertilizer is endogenized (the preferred model), the prob-
lem becomes heavily overidenti￿ed, and ￿ is a more complicated function of the underlying
reduced form parameters.
4.5.2 Extensions to the Basic Model
I consider the following extensions to the basic model40:
1. Covariates: all the identi￿cation arguments presented above generalize when covariates
are included. Covariates can be either exogenous or endogenous. Exogenous covariates
40An extension to three periods is straightforward. The problem is heavily overidenti￿ed with 9 structural
parameters to estimate from the 21 reduced form coe¢ cients for the basic case. Models with three time periods
are not presented here as the 2000 survey does not collect data on family labor inputs. See Suri (2006).
20are uncorrelated with the ￿i￿ s and therefore enter only the reduced form equations
(32) and (33). Endogenous covariates are correlated with the ￿i￿ s and hence also enter
the projection in equation (29). In the case where fertilizer is the other endogenous
covariate, the CRC projection generalizes to
￿i = ￿0 + ￿1hi1 + ￿2hi2 + ￿3hi1hi2 + ￿4hi1fi1 + ￿5hi2fi1 + ￿6hi1hi2fi1
+￿7hi1fi2 + ￿8hi2fi2 + ￿9hi1hi2fi2 + ￿10fi1 + ￿11fi2 + vi (35)
where fit for t = 1;2 represents the use of fertilizer in each period. Adding more en-
dogenous covariates does complicate the CRC model and it can become cumbersome.41
In this case, there are twenty two reduced form coe¢ cients and only fourteen structural
coe¢ cients to be estimated, so the problem becomes heavily overidenti￿ed.
2. Joint choice variables: the two-sector model presented above (hybrid/non-hybrid) can
be extended to multiple sectors. Since the use of hybrid seed and fertilizer are clearly
a joint decision in the data, as a further check, the use of fertilizer is incorporated into
the technology sector. I therefore also estimate a model that looks at the heterogeneity
in returns in a technology sector, where a farmer is in the technology sector when he
uses both hybrid and fertilizer, else he is not in the technology sector.
5 Descriptive Regressions
This section provides estimates of the returns to hybrid from models that assume homogeneity
in these returns. I also present descriptive evidence that illustrates the importance of selection
and heterogeneity in returns, and that there may be selection on these heterogeneous returns.
5.1 OLS and Fixed E⁄ects Estimates
The OLS estimates of the yield functions, controlling for various inputs, are in the ￿rst
columns of Table 3a. The estimates of the average return to hybrid are extremely large:
households that plant hybrid have 54% to 100% higher yields. The fourth and ￿fth columns
of Table 3a report the household ￿xed e⁄ects results. The coe¢ cient on hybrid decreases
to about 9%, indicating a substantial role for heterogeneity in the production function that
is ￿xed across households.42 The simple household ￿xed e⁄ects estimates are consistent
41There is some justi￿cation for treating only fertilizer as endogenous with respect to ￿i. First, the summary
statistics by sector in Table 2b show that there are not big di⁄erences across sectors in the use of other inputs.
Second, using the estimates from the hybrid problem in Table 8a, I correlate the predicted ￿i￿ s with the inputs.
Only the correlations between the ￿i￿ s and fertilizer are important in magnitude and/or signi￿cance.
42The ￿xed e⁄ects framework imposes restrictive assumptions on the underlying adoption process. Apart
from the ￿xed e⁄ect, the adoption decision cannot depend on observed outcomes except under restrictive
21under the assumption of strict exogeneity. Chamberlain￿ s correlated random e⁄ects (CRE)
approach illustrates how the ￿xed e⁄ects model is overidenti￿ed and testable with panel
data.43 Intuitively, the CRE model tests the fact that if the ￿xed e⁄ects model is valid, then
the only way the history of hit a⁄ects the current outcome is through a ￿xed e⁄ect that is
the same in every period. Table 3b shows these tests. It shows both the reduced form and
structural estimates for the CRE model. Covariates can be treated as either exogenous or
endogenous (the latter are assumed to be correlated with the ￿xed e⁄ects). I report estimates
where all the covariates are allowed to be endogenous.44 The CRE estimates of the return to
hybrid are close to the household ￿xed e⁄ects estimates in Table 3a, but the ￿2 values on the
overidenti￿cation test allow me reject the ￿xed e⁄ects model.45 The last column of Table 3b
shows estimates for the case where hybrid is interacted with all the covariates. Though the
coe¢ cient on hybrid is negative, when evaluated at the mean input levels, the mean return
to hybrid is positive.
5.2 IV and Treatment E⁄ect Estimates
This section presents IV and control function estimates of the returns to hybrid, using the
Heckman two-step estimator (also see Garen (1984)). In particular, I present estimates of
the average treatment e⁄ects (ATE), the treatment on the treated (TT), marginal treatment
e⁄ects (MTE) and local average treatment e⁄ects (LATE) under non-random assignment (see
Bj￿rklund and Mo¢ tt (1987) and Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001)).46 These approaches
do not fully address the issues at hand and do not exploit the panel nature of the data, but
they provide useful benchmarks.
With assumptions of normality, it is straightforward to estimate the selection corrected
treatment e⁄ects using a two-step control function procedure. The ￿rst stage is a probit
describing the hybrid adoption decision, from which selection correction terms are computed
assumptions on the transitory component of yields (see Ashenfelter and Card (1985)). Such assumptions
can be motivated by myopia or ignorance of the potential gains from planting hybrid. Both of these seem
unrealistic here since hybrid maize was introduced in the 1960￿ s, with widespread use of extension services
to promote the technology (Evenson and Mwabu (1998)) and data in the survey instrument supports this as
90% of farmers have used hybrid seed at some point in the past.
43With a DGP of yit = ￿+￿hit+￿i+uit, the CRE model is based on the assumption of strict exogeneity, i.e
E(uitjhi1;:::;hiT;￿i) = 0. For the CRE model, the minimum distance estimator is the minimum ￿
2 estimator
if the weight matrix used is the inverse of the variance covariance matrix of the reduced form coe¢ cients. See
Suri (2006) for more detail on this approach for the current setting.
44If I treat only hybrid as endogenous and all the other covariates as exogenous, the results are similar.
45This overidenti￿cation test is an omnibus test and has low power against any speci￿c alternative. It is
therefore not that surprising that I am able to reject the overidentifying restrictions.
46The treatment e⁄ects are de￿ned as follows. The ATE is given by E((y
H ￿ y
N)jX = x) = x(￿
H ￿ ￿
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22and used as controls in second stage sector-speci￿c yield functions. The ATE uses estimates
from this second step. The TT adjusts the estimated ATE for the sample of those who
actually plant hybrid. The slope of the MTE describes whether people who are more likely
to use hybrid for unobservable reasons (i.e. have a higher error in the selection equation)
have higher or lower returns from planting hybrid.
The exclusion restriction I use is the distance to the closest fertilizer store (not to where
fertilizer is actually purchased), which proxies for the availability of the technologies. The
treatment e⁄ects are shown in Table 4 separately for 1997 and 2004. The ATE￿ s are all
large and positive, ranging from 1.3 to 2.4, with smaller TT estimates. The MTE slope is
consistently negative and signi￿cant: ￿ 0.99 in 2004 and -2.51 in 1997. A non-zero MTE slope
implies heterogeneity in returns and the sign of the MTE slope provides information on the
underlying selection process. The negative MTE slopes imply that the farmers who are more
likely to use hybrid are those with the lower relative returns to using hybrid, i.e. there is
negative selection on returns in hybrid.
I also estimate the IV (LATE) speci￿cation. An issue with IV estimates is that the
results are often di⁄erent if di⁄erent instruments are used. This is attributed to underlying
heterogeneity in the population where the separate instruments a⁄ect a di⁄erent subset of the
population, resulting in the di⁄erent LATE estimates (i.e. an average of heterogeneous returns
that is instrument dependent). However, the instrument itself does not always highlight
which subset of the population it a⁄ects (Heckman (1997)). The lower panel of Table 4
reports two versions of IV. The ￿rst column reports an estimate of over 200%, which uses the
distance to the closest stockist of fertilizer as the excluded instrument. The second column
uses the interactions of this distance measure with dummies for the household￿ s asset quintile
as excluded instruments (the distance and asset quintile main e⁄ects are included in both
stages). This strategy allows distance to be more of a constraint for poorer households. These
estimates are on the order of 150%, still very large when compared to the earlier OLS and
household ￿xed e⁄ects estimates, and indicate high returns to hybrid for the supply (of seed
and fertilizer) constrained farmers.
Overall, the preliminary evidence from these approaches indicates large positive returns
for at least some sub-populations of farmers, but also evidence of substantial heterogeneity
in returns with negative selection into the use of hybrid.
5.3 Motivation for Heterogeneity in Returns
This section presents some preliminary regressions that further motivate heterogeneity in
returns. Previous research has developed tests for heterogeneity in returns for experimental
data (see Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997)). Since the data is not experimental, these
23results are not reported here, but using such tests I do reject the null of no heterogeneity.47
Table 5 presents some evidence of selection on the part of farmers in their adoption
decisions. The adoption history of a farmer is split into a set of dummy variables to analyze
whether farmers with di⁄erent histories have di⁄erent returns (see Jakubson (1991) and Card
and Sullivan (1988)). A ￿joiner￿is a farmer who does not plant hybrid the ￿rst period, but
does the next, and a ￿leaver￿is a farmer who plants hybrid the ￿rst period, but not the next.
Similarly, ￿hybrid stayers￿always use hybrid and ￿non-hybrid stayers￿always use non-hybrid.
Table 5 compares the yields for each of these groups in 1997 and 2004 separately. If there
was no selection at all, we would expect the leavers in 1997 to be no di⁄erent from the hybrid
stayers in 1997, and no di⁄erent from the joiners in 2004. Similarly, the joiners in 1997 and
the leavers in 2004 should be no di⁄erent from the omitted group (the non-hybrid stayers).
I can reject most of these restrictions, implying that there is selection and leaver and joiners
are distinct (unlike in a ￿xed e⁄ects model).
Finally, in Table 6, I look for heterogeneity in the returns to hybrid along observables,
estimating OLS and ￿xed e⁄ects yield functions separately for hybrid and non-hybrid farmers.
In the OLS case, the returns to some of the covariates are di⁄erent, though not family or
hired labor. In the case of the ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cations, it is only the return to fertilizer
that is di⁄erent across hybrid and non-hybrid sectors. The last row reports estimates of the
return to hybrid (evaluated at the mean inputs), still showing a signi￿cant return to hybrid.
6 CRC Estimates
This section describes the results for the CRC model. I report estimates for the pure hybrid
model described in detail above (with and without covariates). In addition, I report results
for the endogenous covariates and joint hybrid-fertilizer technology sector models.
Tables 7, 8a, 8b and 8c present the CRC model reduced form and structural estimates.
These tables report only the optimal minimum distance (OMD) estimates where the weight
matrix used in the minimum distance problem is the inverse of the variance covariance matrix
of the reduced form coe¢ cients. If the minimum distance problem is overidenti￿ed, the ￿2 test
statistic on the overidenti￿cation test is the value of the minimand in the OMD problem.48
Throughout, the results show that the selection into hybrid is negative with the farmers
having the lowest yields in non-hybrid having the highest returns to planting hybrid. The
47These tests include looking at the Frechet-Hoe⁄ding bounds, bounding the variance in the percentiles of
the returns distribution and testing whether this bound is di⁄erent from zero (see Suri (2006)).
48Equally weighted minimum distance (EWMD) estimates use the identity matrix as the weight matrix
and diagonally weighted minimum distance (DWMD) estimates use the OMD matrix with the o⁄-diagonal
elements set to zero (see Pischke (1995)). The OMD estimates are e¢ cient, but may be biased in small samples
and can therefore be out-performed by EWMD (see Altonji and Segal (1996)). For all the results in the paper,
the EWMD and DWMD estimates are extremely similar to OMD, but the OMD estimates are asymptotically
e¢ cient, so only those are reported. See Suri (2006) for the EWMD and DWMD estimates.
24estimated ￿ is consistently negative, which illustrates that the households that do better on
average do relatively worse at hybrid as the sign of ￿ describes the sorting process. The CRC
model results are therefore consistent with the earlier MTE results.
Table 7 presents the two period reduced forms for the CRC model. The ￿rst column shows
the reduced form estimates without covariates as a benchmark. The second column controls
for all the inputs and the third for all the inputs interacted with hybrid. The reduced forms
are estimated via seemingly unrelated regressions with the most general variance-covariance
estimation. The estimates in Table 7 are for the basic speci￿cation described above where
hybrid is the only endogenous variable and the projection used is given by equation (29).
Table 8a reports the structural OMD results and the ￿2 statistics for all three speci￿cations.
The estimates of ￿ are consistently negative. I also report the structural estimates for the
case where the sample excludes two districts with very high adult mortality between 1997
and 200449, what I call the non-HIV sample. The results are much more precise and stable
across speci￿cations for this sample.
Tables 8b and 8c present structural estimates of ￿ for the case where fertilizer endoge-
nously enters the farmer￿ s decisions. In Table 8b, I report results for the case where there
is a joint hybrid-fertilizer decision on the part of the farmer so that he is in the technology
sector if he uses both hybrid and fertilizer50, otherwise he is not. Results for ￿ are again
consistently negative, and signi￿cant mostly in the speci￿cations that exclude the two high
mortality districts. Finally, in Table 8c, I allow for fertilizer to be endogenous and correlated
with the ￿i￿ s, using the projection in equation (35). Again, the estimates of ￿ in Table 8c are
consistently negative across all OMD speci￿cations, again more so for the sample without
the two high mortality districts.
Overall, to summarize these results, the null hypothesis that ￿ is equal to zero is often
rejected and estimates of ￿ are consistently negative.51 These results hold predominantly for
the non-HIV districts in the sample, i.e. after leaving out two of the overall 22 districts in the
sample. For these households, the selection into hybrid is negative with the farmers having
the lowest yields in non-hybrid having the highest returns to planting hybrid.
49Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. Jayne and Yamano (2004) document how this
mortality a⁄ects the value of high value crops produced, but not the value or productivity of maize.
50The fertilizer decision I use regards chemical fertilizers. The results are similar if I include the use of
manure as part of the fertilizer decision.
51The results without covariates and across all EWMD and DWMD speci￿cations are similar. In addition,
the following robustness checks give similar results: dropping the Coast Province, allowing for depreciation
of assets used in land preparation (for example, a tractor, which only 2% of households own), valuing all the
inputs where possible, and using estimated pro￿ts instead of yields.
256.1 Recovering the Distribution of b ￿i
Given the CRC structural estimates of the ￿￿ s and the form of the projection given by either
equations (29) or (35), the ￿i￿ s can be predicted for a given history of hybrid (and fertilizer)
use. However, to do so, I must assume that the projections describe the true conditional
expectation of the ￿i￿ s. This is essentially an assumption only for the case of equation (35).
For equation (29), since hit is binary and each history is accounted for, the projection is es-
sentially saturated (for example, polynomials in adoption would be redundant since adoption
is a dummy variable). Using the predicted distribution of ￿i, the predicted ￿i￿ s can be derived
via the yield function. Intuitively, the process of recovering the distribution of ￿i is building a
counterfactual set of returns for the non-adopters using a weighted average of the experience
of every ￿ type￿of farmer, where ￿ type￿refers to the farmer￿ s hybrid history.
For the simple two period model (Table 8a), since the predicted ￿i￿ s are obtained from the
projection in equation (29), the distribution of the predicted ￿i￿ s has just four mass points.
There are only four possible hybrid histories: non-hybrid stayers, hybrid stayers, leavers and
joiners. The results indicate that the non-hybrid stayers have the most negative b ￿i, followed
by the hybrid stayers, then the leavers and joiners. While the non-hybrid stayers have the
lowest predicted ￿i￿ s, they have the highest returns to hybrid as ￿ < 0.52
Using the projection in equation (35), I can similarly estimate the distribution of ￿i using
the estimates in Table 8c. Here, the distribution of the predicted b ￿i￿ s is continuous since
the predicted b ￿i￿ s come from the projection in equation (35), which includes the amount of
fertilizer used. To plot the distribution of the b ￿i￿ s and the overall return to hybrid, I use
the estimates from the third column of Table 8c, which excludes the two HIV districts and
controls only for covariates. This is a simpler model to compute the overall return to hybrid
since hybrid is not interacted with all the covariates. The results are not di⁄erent across the
last two columns in Table 8c, so I opt to use this simpler model for the purposes of plotting
the distribution of the comparative advantage and the returns.
Figure 5a shows the means of the b ￿i by transition - again, the non-hybrid stayers have
the most negative b ￿i, followed by the hybrid stayers, then the leavers and joiners. Figure 5b
shows the distribution of returns across the sample by transition. The distribution of returns
is given by ￿ + ￿￿i where ￿ is the structural coe¢ cient on hit in equation (20), i.e. the
average return to hybrid. Since ￿ < 0, the ordering of returns is the reverse of the ordering of
￿i￿ s, i.e. the non-hybrid stayers have the most negative ￿i￿ s, but the highest positive returns.
The joiners and leavers have close to zero returns (they are the marginal farmers) and the
hybrid stayers have lower positive returns. Note that the sign of ￿ determines the ordering
of the magnitude of the returns across transitions, this ordering is by no means mechanical.
Figure 5c shows the distribution of the predicted b ￿i￿ s by transition. Finally, as a check, Figure
52I do not report these estimates as they do not account for the endogeneity of fertilizer (see Suri (2006)).
265d shows the corresponding distribution of the predicted ￿i￿ s, which were constructed to be
orthogonal to the hybrid choice.
7 Discussion
Figure 5b resolves one puzzle about low adoption rates: the hybrid joiners and leavers are
marginal farmers in the sense of having very low returns as compared to the average return.
However, while the empirical results resolve this one puzzle of why some farmers move in
and out of hybrid despite high returns for the average farmer, the results indicate a further
puzzle: the very large counterfactual returns to growing hybrid for the non-hybrid stayers.
To examine this latter puzzle, I return to the decision rule in equation (25) and relate the
estimated gross returns to observable supply and demographic characteristics of the farmers
(just for the sample excluding the two HIV districts). Table 9 illustrates that the households
with the lower predicted b ￿i￿ s have much higher cost determinants. Recall that throughout
the sample period, the price of hybrid seed was ￿xed across the country. This meant that
seed suppliers had no incentives to locate far away from markets or roads as there was no
compensating price increase.
The regressions in Table 9 therefore correlate the predicted b ￿i￿ s with observable cost
measures in the data.53 The observables considered are the distance from the household to
the closest fertilizer seller, distance to the closest matatu (public transport) stop, distance
to the closest motorable road, distance to the closest extension services, a set of dummies
for education of the household head, a dummy for whether the household tried to get credit,
a dummy for whether the household tried to get credit but did not receive any, a dummy
for whether the household received any credit and province dummies. Villages are large
and heterogeneous and these measures of costs and infrastructure vary even within a village.
The infrastructure and education variables correlate strongly with the predicted b ￿i￿ s, but the
credit variables do not. The last column shows similar results without province dummies.54
These results indicate that while there are high potential returns to the farmers who
never grow hybrid during the sample period, they face higher costs and supply constraints.
The IV/LATE estimates in Table 4 also suggested that distance and infrastructure are con-
straining factors. From Table 4, the IV estimates are about 150%, which implies that those
a⁄ected by the infrastructure instrument are the non-hybrid stayers since these IV estimates
53As pointed out by an anonymous referee, given how the b ￿i￿ s are estimated, it could induce a mechanical
positive correlation between the estimated b ￿i￿ s and the costs even if no such correlation exists. However,
simulating the model for a range of values of ￿ showed that the bias is in the opposite direction to the
correlations reported in Table 9 and must therefore be small. Whenever ￿ < 0, for example, the bias would
always mean a positive coe¢ cient between costs and the estimated b ￿i￿ s, whereas the correlations in Table 9
are all negative.
54These results are all for the model with endogenous hybrid and fertilizer (estimates from Table 8c).
27are of the same magnitude as the estimated returns for the non-hybrid stayers.
Thus, given existing seed supply locations and infrastructure constraints, the adoption
decisions appear to be quite rational. Liberalizing the seed market and seed prices may have
large bene￿ts. In addition, while I do not have the data for a social return calculation to
expanding supply, encouraging greater seed supply to the more remote areas of Kenya could
have large bene￿ts, but will also have large costs of expanding infrastructure.
7.1 Competing Explanations
Finally, I discuss some alternative explanations of adoption behavior that are popular in
the literature. The ￿rst is a model of learning, where households are uninformed about the
bene￿ts of a technology and they experiment to learn what the returns are. Learning models
give rise to the familiar S-shaped curves of adoption rates over time (see Griliches (1957)).
In my data, adoption rates show no dynamics. Aggregate adoption remains constant over
the span of almost ten years. In fact, there are no dynamics in any of the inputs, even after
a large rainfall shock due to El Nino in 1998. Any conventional model of learning does not
appear to be borne out by these aggregates, though there may have been learning e⁄ects
closer to the introduction of hybrid in Kenya - Gerhart (1975) shows S-shaped curves in the
1970￿ s, curves that ￿ attened out at low aggregate adoption rates prior to 1997.
The switching between hybrid and non-hybrid from period to period may look like exper-
imentation, but recall that hybrid and fertilizer have been available for a few decades now.
In addition, 90% and 83% of households have used hybrid and fertilizer before, respectively.
Table 2d does not show any systematic persistence in adoption; the cycling behavior is about
as prevalent as the non-cycling. In the qualitative parts of the survey, farmers who were using
traditional varieties were asked why they were not using hybrid and only about 0.3% cited
experimenting or on trial. And, Du￿ o, Kremer and Robinson (2008a) ￿nd little evidence of
learning in Western Kenya. Learning therefore seems to be unimportant in this setting.55
There are di⁄erent varieties of hybrid, so it may be possible that households are learning
about these types and are switching to newer varieties over time. In this case, there should
still be aggregate increases in adoption over time. For two periods of the survey (2002 and
2004), the data include exactly what type of hybrid variety was used. In 2002, 61.5% of
maize plots were planted with hybrid 614, 6% each of 625 and 627 and 4% of 511. The
release date of these varieties was 1986, 1981, 1996 and the 1960￿ s respectively. In 2004,
69.5% of plots were planted with 614, 5% with 627, 4% each with 625 and 511. It seems that
most households use rather old varieties of hybrid seed. As a further check, I categorize the
55On the methodological side, a learning model with heterogeneity in returns would imply a random coef-
￿cient model with feedback. Chamberlain (1993) shows that such models su⁄er from identi￿cation problems.
Gibbons et al. (2005) estimate a random coe¢ cient model with learning, but they must rely on the structure
of the learning process and an extremely long panel (the NLSY) to identify the model.
28type of hybrid used in 2004 as new or not, where anything released after 1990 is de￿ned as
new. I cannot look at leavers as I do not know what hybrid type they used in 1997, and in
2004 they do not use hybrid. Of the hybrid stayers, about 11.5% use new hybrids and 12.9%
of the joiners use new hybrids. These two means are not statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from each other (the p-value is 0.702).
A second set of alternative explanations deals with the role of credit constraints. Credit
constraints do not seem to be of ￿rst order importance for several reasons. First, a strikingly
large number of households are able to get access to credit, especially for agricultural purposes,
and of those that try to get credit, most get it. In 2004, 41% of all households tried to get
credit and 83% got it. In 1997, these ￿gures were collected for agricultural credit, where
33.7% of households tried to get agricultural credit and 90% got it. There are no signi￿cant
di⁄erences between the hybrid stayers, non-hybrid stayers, leavers and joiners in the three
credit variables (whether the farmer tried to get credit, whether he received it and whether
he tried to get credit but did not receive it). The p-values on these F-tests are all above 0.20.
Also, none of these credit variables correlate strongly with comparative advantage in Table 9.
A caveat here is that these variables are not necessarily good measures of credit constraints,
since households who may be constrained may not even try to get credit.
The patterns in Table 5 also do not ￿t a pure liquidity constraints story. Say the variation
in adoption is completely explained by liquidity constraints. In this case, if a non-hybrid
farmer does better than average in terms of yields, it will lead him to use hybrid in the
next period. But, in that second period, he should have the average hybrid yield, such that
non-hybrid households that have higher yields than average in the ￿rst period should have no
di⁄erent than average hybrid yields in the second period. So, for 1997-2004, the coe¢ cient
on joiners would be greater than zero in 1997, and equal to the coe¢ cient on the hybrid
stayers in 2004. Similarly, the leavers should do worse than the hybrid stayers in 1997 and no
di⁄erent than the non-hybrid stayers in 2004. These joint restrictions are rejected in Table
5. Liquidity constraints alone do not seem to explain the patterns in the data.
The ￿nal alternative hypothesis is di⁄erences in tastes between hybrid and non-hybrid (as
in Latin America). In Kenya, hybrid and non-hybrid output are indistinguishable and sold
at the same price. The survey asked farmers why they chose the variety they plant and an
equal fraction of hybrid and non-hybrid farmers said it was because they preferred the taste.
The di⁄erential tastes hypothesis does not seem to ￿t the Kenyan case.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines the adoption decisions and bene￿ts of hybrid maize in the context of
Kenya, where adoption trends have been relatively constant for the past decade, yet vary
considerably across space. To examine this setting, in contrast to much of the literature
29on technology adoption, I use a framework that abandons learning about a homogeneous
technology, and that instead considers a model and empirical approach that allows for het-
erogeneous returns to hybrid that correlate with the hybrid adoption decision. My framework
emphasizes the large disparities in farming and input supply characteristics across the maize
growing areas of Kenya. Within this framework, I ￿nd that for the non-HIV districts in the
sample, returns to hybrid maize vary greatly. Furthermore, in these districts, farmers who
are on the margin of adopting and disadopting (and who do so during my sample period)
experience little change in yields.
The experimental evidence for Kenya, along with simple OLS and IV estimates, has
indicated average high, positive returns to these agricultural technologies. This has indicated
a puzzle as to why adoption rates had ￿ attened out well below 100% despite the seemingly
large gains that could be had by adopting hybrid. The experimental and IV evidence appeared
to indicate that maize growers in Kenya were leaving ￿money on the table￿by not adopting
hybrid seed. However, the experiments and IV results reveal little else about the returns. The
framework of heterogeneous returns in this paper allows the estimation of not just average
returns, but also the distribution of returns across the sample of farmers. In contrast, I ￿nd
strong evidence of heterogeneity in returns to hybrid maize, with comparative advantage
playing an important role in the determination of yields and adoption decisions.
My ￿ndings regarding the heterogeneity in returns have important implications for policy.
Looking at a distribution of returns across the sample of farmers allows me to separate out
farmers with low returns from those with high returns into a group that could be targeted by
policy interventions. For a small group of farmers in the sample (only 20% of the sample),
returns to growing hybrid (as opposed to their observed choice of non-hybrid) would be
extremely high, yet they do not adopt hybrid maize. I show that these farmers have high
￿xed costs that prevent them from adopting hybrid, as they have poor access to seed and
fertilizer distributors. In terms of policy, alleviating these constraints would increase yields
for these farmers though this may not be a socially optimal intervention. Furthermore,
liberalization of the seed supply market and of hybrid seed prices might encourage seed
suppliers to locate in the more distant areas. For a large fraction of my sample, the returns
to hybrid maize are smaller and these farmers choose to adopt. While I do not build risk into
the choice framework used in this paper, farmers may use hybrid maize, even when the mean
returns to hybrid are low, as it helps insure them against bad outcomes. For these farmers,
since they do not seem to be constrained, they would bene￿t from improved R&D e⁄orts in
developing new hybrid strains and a biotechnology e⁄ort similar to that of, say, India, where
releases of newer hybrids occurs often and leads to continual yield improvements. Finally,
the heterogeneity in returns to the hybrid technology, on the whole, suggests quite rational
and relatively unconstrained adoption of existing hybrid strains, in contrast to the evidence
from the experimental and IV literatures.
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Figure 5dTable 1: Trends in Yields of Staples  
Average Annual % Changes in Yields (Hg/Ha), by Decade 
 








       
Kenya       
Maize 0.362  2.373  1.169  -1.198 
Wheat 5.646  2.333  -3.078  0.984 
       
India       
Maize  1.502  0.842 1.900 2.572 
Wheat    4.876  2.514 3.343 1.235 
Rice  0.954  1.714 3.310 0.838 
       
Mexico       
Maize   2.057  4.267  -0.548  1.447 
Wheat 4.586  3.204  -0.255  1.664 
       
Zambia       
Maize -0.267  10.403  1.571  -1.707 
       
Notes:  Surprisingly, in the 1960’s the levels of yields of maize in Kenya, India and Mexico were comparable and very similar (all ranging 
between 10,000 and 12,000 Hg/Ha). The levels of yields in Zambia were slightly lower (about 8,000 Hg/Ha) whereas those in Uganda 
and Malawi were comparable to those in Kenya. 
Source:  FAOSTAT Online Database 
 Table 2a: Summary Statistics, by Sample Year 
 




      
Yield (Log Maize Harvest Per Acre)  5.907 (1.153)  6.350 (0.977) 
 
Acres Planted  1.903 (3.217)  1.957 (2.685) 
 
Total Seed Planted (Kg per Acre)  9.575 (7.801)  9.072 (6.863) 
 
Total Purchased Hybrid Planted (Kg per Acre)  6.273 (6.926)  5.080 (5.260) 
    
Hybrid (dummy)  0.658 (0.475)  0.604 (0.489) 
    
Fertilizer (Kg DAP (di-ammonium phosphate) per Acre)  20.300 (38.444)  24.610 (34.001) 
    
Fertilizer (Kg MAP (mono-ammonium phosphate)  per Acre)  1.566 (10.165)  0.308 (4.538) 
    
Fertilizer (Kg CAN (calcium ammonium nitrate) per Acre)  6.473 (24.727)  8.957 (21.702) 
    
Total Fertilizer Expenditure (KShs per Acre)  1361.7 (2246.3)  1354.6 (1831.2) 
    
Land Preparation Costs (Kshs per Acre)  960.88 (1237.1)  541.43 (1022.8) 
    
Family Labor (Hours per Acre)  293.25 (347.49)  354.27 (352.68) 
    
Hired Labor (KShs per Acre)  1766.0 (3346.4)  1427.4 (2130.3) 
    
Main Season Rainfall (mm)  620.83 (256.43)  728.11 (293.29) 
    
Distance to Closest Fertilizer Seller (km)  6.288 (9.774)  3.469 (5.964) 
    
Household Size  7.109 (2.671)  8.409 (3.521) 
    
Notes:  Standard deviations in parentheses. KShs is Kenyan shillings (exchange rate over this period was KShs 75 = 1$).  All monetary variables are deflated.Table 2b: Summary Statistics, by Hybrid/Non-Hybrid Use 
 




Hybrid Non-Hybrid  Hybrid Non-Hybrid 
        
No. of Households  791  411  726  476 
Yield (Log Maize Harvest Per Acre)  6.296 (0.934)  5.158 (1.167)  6.751 (0.692)  5.738 (1.030) 
Total Maize Acres Cultivated  1.982 (3.557)  1.753 (2.428)  2.087 (3.029)  1.758 (2.042) 
        
Total Seed Planted (Kg per Acre)  9.669 (6.569)  9.394 (9.750)  8.746 (4.156)  9.569 (9.608) 
        
Fertilizer (Kg DAP per Acre)  28.755 (44.115)  4.028 (13.266)  37.148 (37.294)  5.488 (13.909) 
        
Fertilizer (Kg CAN per Acre)  9.087 (29.715)  1.442 (7.152)  12.708 (24.961)  3.235 (13.622) 
        
Land Preparation Costs (KShs/Acre)  1043.9 (1242.7)  801.08 (1211.7)  659.83 (1079.7)  360.83 (901.0) 
        
Expenditure on Fertilizer (KShs/Acre)  1922.3 (2542.9)  282.64 (740.53)  1893.3 (1964.7)  533.09 (1211.4) 
        
Inorganic Fertilizer Use (Dummy)  0.7421 (0.4378)  0.2311 (0.4221)  0.8994 (0.3009)  0.4055(0.4915) 
        
Main Season Rainfall (mm)  651.70 (228.82)  561.44 (293.88)  825.41 (215.20)  579.69 (332.05) 
        
Hired Labor (KShs/Acre)  1864.3 (2680.6)  1576.7 (4347.8)  1616.5 (2197.4)  1139.0 (1991.6) 
        
Family Labor (Hours/Acre)  260.35 (264.13)  356.57 (461.71)  343.6 (336.1)  370.58 (376.33) 
        
Distance to Closest Fertilizer Seller (km)  4.684 (7.993)  9.374 (11.93)  2.419 (2.420)  5.069 (8.760) 
        
Household Size  7.162 (2.616)  7.007 (2.773)  8.457 (3.340)  8.336 (3.783) 
        
Notes:  Standard deviations in parentheses. The mean of yields is higher and the standard deviation of yields is lower in the hybrid sector.  Table 2c: Break Down of Labor Costs 
By Hybrid/Non-Hybrid Use 
 
   
1997 Sample  2004 Sample 
 
Hybrid Non-Hybrid  Hybrid  Non-Hybrid 
        
Hired Labor (KShs/Acre)        
  Land Preparation  408.4 (1171)  514.2 (3178)  408.2 (869.1)  501.8 (1096) 
  Planting  159.8 (318.9)  105.4 (293.5)  143.4 (354.1)  76.67 (216.9) 
  Weeding  678.8 (1149)  651.8 (1484)  635.7 (1088)  403.1 (915.5) 
  Harvest  365.1 (642.5)  196.6 (766.1)  151.1 (303.5)  96.42 (340.5) 
  Post-Harvest Activities  236.5 (472.6)  98.65 (308.6)  241.1 576.7  47.37 (182.1) 
  Fertilizer Application  15.21 (84.67)  10.02 (156.4)  13.24 (79.32)  2.374 (28.04) 
  Other  0.501 (9.727)  0 (0)  23.84 (281.6)  11.26 (227.5) 
          
Family Labor (Hrs/Acre)        
  Land Preparation  47.95 (113.5)  102.4 (214.6)  51.93 (98.22)  97.79 (180.1) 
  Planting  29.12 (31.81)  35.23 (45.19)  38.27 (56.13)  39.55 (49.01) 
  Weeding  93.75 (107.1)  127.5 (151.6)  120.1 (151.3)  134.6 (160.2) 
  Harvest  42.45 (46.04)  49.54 (143.0)  58.77 (72.36)  49.60 (62.80) 
  Post-Harvest Activities  44.07 (55.77)  39.89 (70.00)  68.54 (91.76)  44.69 (59.98) 
  Fertilizer Application  3.171 (8.778)  1.935 (15.09)  3.928 (9.976)  1.510 (6.706) 
  Other  0.047 (1.313)  0 (0)  2.041 (13.62)  2.814 (24.73) 
        
Notes:  Standard deviations in parentheses. On average, family labor accounts for 75% of total labor use (the rest being hired labor). The main production 
activities that use labor are listed above. Land preparation accounts for 23% of total labor use on average, planting accounts for 10%, weeding accounts 
for 36% and harvesting and post harvesting activities account for 30%. Post harvesting activities include threshing, winnowing, bagging and storing the 
maize.  Table 2d: Transitions Across Hybrid/Non-Hybrid Sectors 
For the Sample Periods 1997, 2000 and 2004 
 
 
Transition in Terms of Technology Used  
(1997 2000 2004) 
 
Fraction of Sample (%) 
(N=1202 Households) 
     
N N N   20.38 
  
N N H   2.83 
  
H N H  6.07 
  
N H H  4.91 
  
H N N  5.99 
  
H N H  3.16 
  
H H N  7.15 
  
H H H   49.50 
  
Notes:   This table shows all the possible three period transitions in my sample of farmers, and the fraction of my sample that experiences each of these 
transitions. The three periods correspond to 1997, 2000 and 2004. In the first column, the three letters represent the transition history with respect to 
technology, where “H” represents the use of hybrid and “N” represents the use of non-hybrid. For example, the transition “N N N” stands for farmers 
who used non-hybrid maize in all three periods – they make up about 20.4% of my sample.      
  The survey instrument asks about hybrid use in multiple sections of the questionnaire (since it is a rather large part of household decisions). We check 
and confirm the coherency of these responses in the field, which greatly reduces the likelihood that the observed switching behavior is appreciably 
affected by measurement error.  Table 3a: Basic OLS and Fixed Effects Specifications 
Dependent Variable is Yields (Log Maize Harvest Per Acre) 
 
  
OLS, Pooled  
 
OLS, Pooled  
 





         
Hybrid  1.074 (0.040)  0.695 (0.039)  0.541 (0.041)  0.017 (0.070)  0.090 (0.065) 
         
Acres (x1000)  -  -  0.035 (5.749)  -  -0.509 (0.140) 
         
Seed Kg per Acre (x10)  -  -  0.184 (0.024)  -  0.179 (0.032) 
         
Land Preparation Costs per Acre 
(x1000) 
-  -  0.066 (0.016)  -  0.075 (0.023) 
         
Fertilizer per Acre (x1000)  -  -  0.075 (0.009)  -  0.054 (0.012) 
         
Hired Labor per Acre (x1000)  -  -  0.037 (0.006)  -  0.027 (0.008) 
         
Family Labor per Acre (x1000)  -  -  0.374 (0.050)  -  0.467 (0.072) 
         
Year = 2004  0.501 (0.038)  0.480 (0.035)  0.566 (0.041)  0.444 (0.032)  0.587 (0.044) 
         
Constant  5.200 (0.038)  4.636 (0.080)  3.954 (0.113)  5.896 (0.051)  -2.383 (5.582) 
         
Province Dummies  No Yes  Yes  -  - 
         
R-Squared  0.266 0.400  0.502 0.049  0.089   
         
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions have 2404 observations (two periods). Covariates not reported include household size, controls for 
the age-sex composition of the household (henceforth this includes variables for the number of boys (aged <16 years), the number of girls, the number 
of men (aged 17-39), the number of women and the number of older men (aged>40 years)), the main season rainfall and the average long term main 
season rainfall.  Results are almost identical if the sample is for three periods without family labor as a covariate. Hired labor is measured in KShs per 
acre and family labor is measured in hours per acre. The OLS and household fixed effects specifications run are: 
yit    hit  Xit
′
  it      yit    i  hit  Xit
′
  it  Table 3b: CRE Model Reduced Forms and Structural Estimates 
Dependent Variable is Yields (Log Maize Harvest Per Acre) 
 
Reduced Form Estimates  





With Covariates and Interactions 
of Covariates with Hybrid 
  Yields, 1997 Yields,  2004 Yields,  1997 Yields,  2004 Yields,  1997 Yields,  2004 
           
Hybrid, 1997  0.674 (0.075)  0.538 (0.065)  0.579 (0.064)  0.415 (0.060)  0.467 (0.242)  0.501 (0.228) 
Hybrid, 2004  0.809 (0.072)  0.723 (0.062)  0.411 (0.065)  0.563 (0.063)  1.214 (0.259)  0.630 (0.230) 
           
 
 
Optimal Minimum Distance (OMD) Structural Estimates 





With Covariates and Interactions of Covariates with Hybrid 
      
β  0.0322 (0.0701)  0.1588 (0.0653)  -0.3039 (0.2522) 
λ1  0.5795 (0.0621)  0.4166 (0.0570)  0.5683 (0.2103) 
λ2  0.7332 (0.0684)  0.4062 (0.0622)  1.0447 (0.2351) 
      
χ
2
1  44.63 0.193  460.5 
      
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. Reduced forms are estimated without covariates, with covariates (acreage, real fertilizer expenditure, real land 
preparation costs, seed, labor, household size, household age-sex composition variables and rainfall variables) and with all covariates interacted with 
hybrid. The covariates are all treated as endogenous. Results are the same if three periods without family labor are used. Results are similar if all 
covariates except hybrid are treated as exogenous.    
  The reduced form for each t, the projection used to estimate the structural model by minimum distance and the structural model are respectively: 
yit  t  1thi1  2thi2  3thi3  Xi
′
t  it                     i  0  1hi1  2hi2  vi                     yit    hit  i  uit  
Structural coefficients β and projection coefficients (λ’s) are reported.  OMD are optimal (weighted by inverted reduced form variance-covariance 
matrix) minimum distance estimates. Equally weighted (using the identity matrix) and diagonally weighted (using only the diagonal elements from the 






Heckman Two-Step Estimates: Selection Correction λ 
 
Implied Treatment Effects 
Hybrid Sector  Non-Hybrid Sector  ATE  TT  MTE Slope 
          
1997  -0.854 (0.170)  1.659 (0.864)  2.391  0.917  -2.512 (0.880) 
          
2004  -0.957 (0.181)  0.028 (0.152)  1.279 
 
0.921 -0.985  (0.237) 
 
IV (LATE) Estimates (Conditional on Covariates) 
    
First Stage: Effect of Distance  -0.288 (0.108)  - 
First Stage: Effect of Distance Interacted with Wealth Quintile (x 100)   
  Second Wealth Quintile (Coefficient on Interaction) -  -0.221  (0.302) 
  Third Wealth Quintile (Coefficient on Interaction)  -  -0.057 (0.032) 
  Fourth Wealth Quintile (Coefficient on Interaction)  -  0.329 (0.288) 
  Fifth Wealth Quintile (Coefficient on Interaction)  -  0.507 (0.273) 
F Test p-value on Excluded Instruments   0.008 0.108 
Second Stage: Effect of Predicted Hybrid on Yields  2.768 (1.123)  1.536 (0.816) 
   
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions control for covariates. The first two upper panel columns show (for each year) the two-step selection 









H  H Zi
′ /Zi
′  and yi
N  Xi
′
N  N Zi
′ / 1 − Zi
′ 
 
The third column reports the average treatment effect accounting for selection and the fourth column the treatment on the treated. Finally, the MTE 
slope is just the difference in the λ coefficients for the hybrid and non-hybrid selection terms (the difference between coefficients reported in the first 
two columns). ATE, TT, MTE are all evaluated at the mean Xi’s. The lower panel reports two set of IV estimates. The first column uses the distance to 
closest fertilizer supplier (not where fertilizer is purchased) as the excluded instrument. The second column uses the distance interacted with wealth 
quintiles as excluded instruments (controlling for the asset quintile dummies and the distance main effect in both stages).  
All regressions control for the full set of covariates as per earlier tables (including household size and controls for the age-sex composition of the 
household as above). Table 5: Selection 
Returns by Hybrid History (Joiners, Leavers and Stayers) 








1997 Yield  2004 Yield  1997 Yield  2004 Yield 
      
Hybrid Stayers   1.505 (0.066)  1.280 (0.056)  0.869 (0.073)  0.683 (0.063) 
       
Leavers  0.809 (0.094)  0.648 (0.079)  0.537 (0.084)  0.370 (0.069) 
       
Joiners  1.007 (0.114)  0.883 (0.096)  0.469 (0.101)  0.498 (0.084) 
        
Acres (x100)  -  -  0.561 (0.782)  -0.744 (0.802) 
       
Seed Kg per Acre (x10)  -  -  0.218 (0.035)  0.197 (0.032) 
       
Land Preparation Costs per Acre (x1000)  -  -  0.066 (0.023)  0.058 (0.021) 
        
Fertilizer per Acre (x1000)  -  -  0.063 (0.012)  0.061 (0.012) 
       
Hired Labor per Acre (x1000)  -  -  0.028 (0.008)  0.057 (0.010) 
       
Family Labor per Acre (x1000)  -  -  0.415 (0.075)  0.318 (0.064) 
        
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  In each year, the following regression is run both with and without the covariates:  
yi    1hi11  2hi10  3hi01  Xi
′
  ui  
where hi11 is the dummy indicating that farmer i is a hybrid stayer (plants hybrid in both periods), hi10 indicates he is a leaver (plants hybrid the first 
year, not the second), hi01 indicates he is a joiner (plants hybrid the second year, not the first).  The coefficients reported are μ1, μ 2 and μ 3.  Covariates 
included that are not reported above are province dummies, household size, variables for the age-sex composition of the household (includes variables 
for the number of boys (aged <16 years), the number of girls, the number of men (aged 17-39), the number of women and the number of older men 
(aged>40 years)), the main season rainfall and the average long term main season rainfall.  
Note that hired labor is measured in KShs per acre and family labor is measured in hours per acre.  Table 6:  Heterogeneity by Observables 
Returns in the Hybrid/Non-Hybrid Sector  





OLS, with Covariates 
 
FE, with Covariates 
Hybrid   Non-Hybrid  Hybrid   Non-Hybrid 
        
Acres (x 10)  0.144 (0.056)  -0.053 (0.149)  -0.381 (0.153)  -0.941 (0.379) 
        
Seed Kg per Acre (x 10)  0.281 (0.035)  0.129 (0.036)  0.219 (0.047)  0.147 (0.063) 
        
Land Preparation Costs per Acre (x 1000)  0.056 (0.018)  0.135 (0.031)  0.033 (0.024)  0.097 (0.060) 
        
Fertilizer per Acre (x 1000)  0.064 (0.008)  0.143 (0.032)  0.040 (0.011)  0.081 (0.086) 
        
Hired Labor per Acre (x1000)  0.047 (0.007)  0.026 (0.010)  0.054 (0.011)  0.035 (0.029) 
        
Family Labor per Acre (x1000)  0.297 (0.064)  0.435 (0.081)  0.497 (0.094)  0.581 (0.177) 
        
Year = 2004  0.568 (0.050)  0.595 (0.068)  0.467 (0.058)  0.689 (0.096) 
        
Average Return (β) when Returns Vary by 
Observables (evaluated at mean X’s) 
0.480 
(0.048)   
0.091 
(0.076) 
        
Number of Observations  1517 887  1517  887 
        
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  The following specification is estimated separately for the sample of farmers who use hybrid and non-hybrid maize: 
yit
j  j  Xtij  it
j j ∈ H,N 
The covariates included that are not reported are province dummies, household size, age-sex composition of the household (includes variables for the 
number of boys (aged <16 years), the number of girls, the number of men (aged 17-39), the number of women and the number of older men (aged>40 
years)), the main season rainfall and the average long term main season rainfall.  
The results are similar for the three period sample without family labor as a covariate. 
Note that hired labor is measured in KShs per acre and family labor is measured in hours per acre.  Table 7: Two Period Basic Comparative Advantage CRC Model Reduced Form Estimates 
Dependent Variable is Yields (Log Maize Harvest Per Acre) 
 
   
Without Covariates 
 
With Endogenous Covariates 
 
With Interactions with Hybrid 
Yields, 1997  Yields, 2004  Yields, 1997  Yields, 2004  Yields, 1997  Yields, 2004 
           
Hybrid, 1997  0.833 (0.121)  0.471 (0.099)  0.719 (0.103)  0.316 (0.088)  0.926 (0.252)  0.139 (0.092) 
           
Hybrid, 2004  1.139 (0.122)  0.766 (0.103)  0.702 (0.110)  0.508 (0.092)  0.474 (0.122)  0.520 (0.222) 
           
Hybrid 1997*Hybrid 2004  -0.458 (0.156)  -0.194 (0.132)  -0.358 (0.132)  -0.098 (0.110)  -0.084 (0.147)  -0.115 (0.117) 
           
Acres  (x10)  -  -  0.106 (0.067)  -0.006 (0.098)  -0.220 (0.302)  -0.799 (0.300) 
           
Seed Kg per Acre (x 10)  -  -  0.230 (0.052)  0.433 (0.060)  0.211 (0.062)  0.200 (0.086) 
           
Land Preparation Cost per 
Acre (x 1000) 
-  -  0.124 (0.025)  0.133 (0.039)  0.033 (0.051)  0.353 (0.077) 
           
Fertilizer per Acre (x 1000)  -  -  0.079 (0.018)  0.042 (0.014)  0.281 (0.073)  0.106 (0.035) 
           
Hired Labor per Acre (x 1000)  -  -  0.025 (0.014)  0.053 (0.010)  0.008 (0.014)  0.049 (0.019) 
           
Family Labor per Acre (x 1000)  -  -  0.399 (0.115)  0.186 (0.071)  0.676 (0.187)  0.198 (0.128) 
              
R-Squared  0.285 0.232 0.454  0.441  0.486  0.489 
           
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. Reduced forms are estimated with standard covariates and then with interactions of all the covariates with hybrid. 
Covariates not reported include main season rainfall, household size and age-sex composition of the household (includes variables for the number of 
boys (aged <16 years), the number of girls, the number of men (aged 17-39), the number of women and the number of older men (aged>40 years)). Note 
that hired labor is measured in KShs per acre and family labor is measured in hours per acre. Where the covariates are interacted with hybrid, only main 
effects of the covariates are reported. Reduced forms are for the case where all covariates are exogenous: only hybrid is correlated with the comparative 
advantage, θi.  See Table 8 for the projection and structural estimates. The reduced form equations run are as follows for 1997 and 2004 respectively:  
yi1  1  1hi1  2hi2  3hi1hi2  i1               yi2  2  4hi1  5hi2  6hi1hi2  i2 Table 8a: Two Period Basic Comparative Advantage CRC Model OMD Structural Estimates 
 
  
With Only Hybrid Endogenous  
Full Sample  Without HIV Districts 
Without 









          
λ1  0.648 (0.093)  0.565 (0.087)  0.456 (0.090)  0.471 (0.099)  0.305 (0.089)  0.139 (0.092) 
          
λ2  1.007 (0.112)  0.665 (0.104)  0.473 (0.116)  1.139 (0.122)  0.710 (0.112)  0.466 (0.123) 
          
λ3  1.636 (4.854)  -1.690 (4.316)  -0.485 (0.199)  -4.800 (9.173)  -0.936 (0.308)  -0.497 (0.257) 
          
β  -0.543 (1.874)  1.023 (1.480)  3.534 (24.05)  2.287 (4.222)  0.623 (0.100)  0.790 (0.169) 
          
φ  -0.794 (0.411)  -1.317 (1.262)  -17.82 (137.4)  -1.010 (0.228)  -1.518 (0.310)  -2.196 (1.142) 
          
χ
2
1  40.089 11.25  139.5 175.5 114.1 305.2 
          
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. The reduced forms for these estimates are reported in Table 7 (for the case where only the hybrid decision is 
endogenous, i.e. correlated with the θi’s).  The projection used in this model is: 
i  0  1hi1  2hi2  3hi1hi2  vi  
The structural coefficients reported are the average return to hybrid (β), the comparative advantage coefficient (ф), and the projection coefficients (λ’s).  
OMD is optimal weighted (the weight matrix is the inverted reduced form variance-covariance matrix) minimum distance. Results from diagonally 
weighted (the weight matrix is the OMD weight matrix with the off diagonal elements set to zero) and equally weighted minimum distance are similar.   
The χ
2 statistic on the overidentification test is the value of the OMD minimand.   
Results are reported for two samples: the full sample and the sample without two districts where HIV is prevalent. 
In addition, minimum distance results for three different specifications are reported: without covariates, with covariates and with covariates and 
interactions of the covariates with the hybrid decision (reported in Table 7). All the specifications with covariates assume that all covariates are 
exogenous: only hybrid is correlated with the comparative advantage, θi.   
Covariates include acreage, land preparation costs, fertilizer, hired labor, family labor, main season rainfall, household size and age-sex composition of 
the household (includes variables for the number of boys (aged <16 years), the number of girls, the number of men (aged 17-39), the number of women 
and the number of older men (aged>40 years)).  Table 8b: Joint Sector Comparative Advantage CRC Model OMD Structural Estimates 
 
  With Joint Sector Fertilizer-Hybrid Decision 
Full Sample  Without HIV Districts 
With Covariates  With Interactions with Hybrid  With Covariates  With Interactions with Hybrid 
       
β  0.639 (0.095)  1.148 (0.813)  0.420 (0.051)  0.901 (0.175) 
       
φ  -1.602 (1.684)  -3.133 (4.003)  -1.687 (0.554)  -2.051 (1.282) 
       
 
Table 8c: Comparative Advantage CRC Model OMD Estimates: Both Hybrid and Fertilizer Endogenous  
 
With Both Fertilizer and Hybrid as Endogenous 
Projection:  i  0  1hi1  2hi2  3hi1hi2  4hi1fi1  5hi2fi1  6hi1hi2fi1  7hi1fi2  8hi2fi2  9hi1hi2fi2  10fi1  11fi2  vi  
 
Full Sample  Without HIV Districts 
With Covariates  With Interactions with Hybrid  With Covariates  With Interactions with Hybrid 
       
β  0.088 (0.096)  0.915 (0.417)  0.603 (0.060)  0.686 (0.174) 
       
φ  -0.449 (0.176)  -3.772 (2.707)   -1.788 (0.277)  -2.118 (0.641) 
       
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. OMD is optimal weighted (the weight matrix is the inverted reduced form variance-covariance matrix) minimum 
distance. Results from diagonally weighted (the weight matrix is the OMD weight matrix with the off diagonal elements set to zero) and equally 
weighted minimum distance are similar. The structural coefficients reported are average return to hybrid (β), the comparative advantage coefficient (ф).  
Results are reported for two samples: the full sample and the sample without two HIV districts and are for two periods of data. 
  In addition, minimum distance results for two different specifications are reported: with covariates and with covariates and interactions of the covariates 
with the hybrid decision. All the specifications with covariates assume that all covariates other than hybrid and/or fertilizer are exogenous. 
Covariates include acreage, land preparation costs, fertilizer, hired labor, family labor, main season rainfall, household size and age-sex composition of 
the household (includes variables for the number of boys (aged <16 years), the number of girls, the number of men (aged 17-39), the number of women 
and the number of older men (aged>40 years)).  Table 9: Correlates of Estimated θi’s 
Dependent Variable is the Estimated θi’s 
 










          
Distance to Closest Fertilizer Seller  (x100)  -0.301 (0.122)  -0.289 (0.121)  -0.285 (0.121)  -0.285 (0.121)  -0.315 (0.063) 
          
Distance to Motorable Road  (x100)  -0.904 (0.503)  -0.887 (0.501)  -0.901 (0.502)  -0.898 (0.501)  -0.978 (0.285) 
        
Distance to Matatu Stop  (x100)  0.032 (0.298)  -0.034 (0.298)  -0.016 (0.298)  -0.028 (0.299)  -0.021 (0.165) 
        
Distance to Extension Services  (x100)   -0.130 (0.155)  -0.063 (0.155)  -0.063 (0.155)  -0.061 (0.155)  0.002 (0.091) 
        
Tried to Get Credit  (x10)  - -0.138  (0.153) -  -  - 
        
Tried but Didn’t Receive Credit  (x10)  - -  0.027  (0.347)  - - 
        
Received Credit  (x10)  - - -  -0.047  (0.154)  -0.164  (0.144) 
        
Dummies for Household Head Education 









        
Province Dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes No 
        
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  This table reports the correlations of the predicted θi’s with various observables. The predicted θi’s used are from the 
two period case with endogenous hybrid and fertilizer use (Table 8c). The observables are the average of the 1997 and 2004 values. Columns (1) 
through (4) show the results while controlling for province dummies. Since a lot of the variation in infrastructure may be aggregate, column (5) also 
shows the results without province dummies, but just for the “Received Credit” variable on the credit side (the results are no different for the other credit 
variables).   